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Abstract
Share repurchase activity has grown significantly over the past twenty years and
has emerged as the most popular technique for returning cash to shareholders. Current
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles treat share repurchases as a return of
capital to shareholders, recording the repurchased shares at market prices and offsetting
them against contributed capital accounts. This treatment reduces the recorded book
value of the equity of companies. Of course, companies can reissue these shares to fulfill
stock option contracts, as consideration in acquisitions, and/or in secondary offerings.
These economically relevant uses of repurchased shares suggest that the market may treat
share repurchases differently than GAAP-based accounting. This study employs the
Fama-French 3-Factor Model to test five potential views on repurchased shares: 1) a
permanent return of capital to shareholders; 2) a prepaid cash expense related to stockoptions; 3) the monetization of internally generated goodwill; 4) a prepaid asset that can
be used as consideration in a future acquisition; and 5) a put option on company shares.
Results suggest that the current accounting treatment is as good or better than all other
possibilities for diversified portfolios, but we do find support for other treatments in
certain industries.
Keywords: Share Repurchases, Stock Options, Dividends, Goodwill, Fama-French 3Factor Model, Book Value
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“Buying back shares is the simplest and best way a company can reward its investors.” Peter Lynch 1990
“It’s very politically correct to be against buybacks right now.” Warren Buffet May 2, 2020

Procter and Gamble (P&G) and Clorox are two consumer staple giants. Between
2014-2018, these two companies had operating margins around 20%, adjusted net income
grew marginally, and both paid out between 60%-70% of adjusted income in dividends.
During this period, Clorox repurchased between 1-2% of weighted average shares each
year, while P&G repurchased 2%-6% of its shares annually, resulting in substantial
increases in treasury stock for both companies. By 2018, P&G’s book value was $55
billion with $94 billion in treasury stock. Clorox reported book value of $726 million
with $547 million of treasury stock. The reduction in the book values due to the share
repurchases made these companies not comparable on a multiple basis, a traditional
practitioner method of valuation, with P&G’s price to book fluctuating between 3x and
4x earnings, while Clorox traded between 23x and 72x book value. (Bloomberg, 2020b).
The United States’ economy grew from March 2009 to December 2019 with
barely few disruptions (St. Louis Federal Reserve, 2020). During that time, profits
generated by the S&P 500 grew at a compound annual growth rate of 9% (Bloomberg,
2021a), and interest rates fell to record lows and remained relatively low throughout the
expansion. The combination of high profits and historically low interest rates generated
huge amounts of capital for companies to deploy. Prominent among the financial
strategies was the return of cash to shareholders via share repurchases and/or dividends.
In 1997, share buybacks surpassed dividends as the most common strategy for returning
cash to shareholders, and share buybacks continue to grow in value, frequency, and
volume. In 2019, the S&P 500 member companies conducted share repurchases totaling
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$728.7 billion and paid dividends totaling $485.5 billion. Thus, collectively the S&P 500
returned $1.214 trillion to shareholders, which exceed the collective $1.158 trillion of
earnings. From 2014-2019, cash returned to shareholders (share repurchases +
dividends) exceeded net income in four of the five years (Zeng & Luk, 2020). The Tax
Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 accelerated the buyback trend. The volume was so high
Goldman Sachs warned that the “buyback boom was getting out of hand,” as buybacks
exceeded free cash flows (Egan, 2019).

Figure 1: “Aggregate Dividends and Buybacks Paid by U.S. Firms and the
Percentage of Firms with Positive Dividend and Buybacks in the U.S. (Zeng & Luk,
2020, p. 2)

Historically, only distressed firms tended to report negative book values. Over the
last ten years, that has changed. From 2014-2016 McDonald’s reduced its total equity
from $12.8 billion to a negative $2.2 billion, despite earnings of more than $9 billion over
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that period. The company chose to repurchase $16 billion of shares during these years in
addition to its generous dividend policy (McDonald's Inc., 2020). As of April 6, 2021, 23
firms in the S&P 500 reported negative book value at the end of their last fiscal year, but
only three of these firms had a default probability above 1% and could be considered to
be experiencing some financial distress duress (Bloomberg, 2021a).
This shift in strong firms’ attitudes towards debt and negative book values raises
questions about the relative effectiveness of some traditional financial valuation models
in the new changed financial environment. Earlier in the 20th century, analysts widely
applied the discounted dividends model. However, this model was supplanted over the
years as companies’ financial policies changed regarding the widespread payment of
dividends. In 2019, Pinto, Robinson and Stowe found that 86.8% of equity analysts used
a discounted cash flow approach to justify valuation, while only 35.1% continued to use a
dividend discount model. Has the share buyback craze necessitated another such change?
The same team found multiples are still the most popular valuation technique, but
professionals heavily favor price to earnings (88.1%) and Enterprise Value (76.7%) based
multiples over the more skewed book value-based models (59.0%). Analysts might need
to adjust book values to bring these forms of valuation back in line with the financial
engineering of modern Wall Street. It is essential when screening for stocks. For
example, Fairchild (2018) showed a portfolio made up of all negative book value stocks
from 1993-2018 outperformed the market, earning a 12.3% annualized return compared
to the market’s 11.6%.
Many multi-factor capital asset pricing models use reported book values. For
example, the HML factor in Fama French’s 3 Factor Model (1992) is the basis of many
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Wall Street firms’ alpha calculations, a metric used to determine mutual fund manager
performance.1 Ma, Tang, and Gomez’s (2019) hand collected data show that 75% of
mutual funds directly link their portfolio manager’s bonus to performance.

If

repurchased shares skew the HML factor but are not adjusted in models, alpha values
could be systematically overstated due to an incorrect assessment of risk (value vs.
growth stocks), and they could be overcompensating their mutual fund managers.
Treasury Stock
When a corporation repurchases shares, it has two choices – retire the shares or
hold the shares as treasury stock. Treasury stock is reported as a negative component of
stockholders’ equity on the balance sheet. As of April 12, 2021, 60% of the S&P 500
companies held treasury stock (Bloomberg, 2021b). Of the S&P firms that repurchased
shares in their last fiscal year, 75% held the shares in treasury (Bloomberg, 2021b). This
preference is logical, as most companies use stock grants to compensate classes of
employees, which is one possible use of treasury stock. However, most of these
companies hold more treasury shares than they could practically issue as compensation.
Reasons for doing so include having them for a possible secondary offering or funding
future stock-based acquisitions. Many companies simply prefer the option of reissuing
shares without seeking the Securities and Exchange Commission and shareholder
approval. Managers appear to desire this financial flexibility, but how does the market
value treasury stock?
Alternative Accounting Treatments for Treasury Stock

1

"The alpha of a stock is its expected return in excess of (or below) the fair expected return as predicted by
the CAPM. If the stock is fairly priced, its alpha must be zero” (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2005, p.328).
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Current U.S. accounting rules treat treasury stock transactions as a reduction in
cash and a corresponding reduction in Shareholders’ Equity (FASB, 2020). This
treatment was in place as early as 1919 when thought leaders of the day, including
William Paton, opined that treasury stock was a reduction of equity, not an asset. Since
the company retains the right to reissue these shares, this reduction in capital may be
temporary or permanent. Walsh (1975) took an opposing view, suggesting that
purchasing treasury stock is akin to an investment by a company in its stock. Van Horne
(1971) countered Walsh, arguing that since treasury stock does not add to the earnings
power of the company, it cannot be considered an investment. Instead, it should be
viewed as a financing decision. Each of these theoretical views has merit. Which view
does the market appear to adopt?
There are five possible answers to the question of how the market implicitly treats
treasury stock.


Repurchasing shares is a real return of equity capital and should be treated as a reduction
in the reported book value of shareholders’ equity.



Repurchasing shares is at least in part prepaid compensation expense and should be
reported as a prepaid asset as a result.



Repurchasing shares is the monetization of internally developed intellectual property and
other intangible assets. As such, it should be reported as an intangible asset on the
balance sheet.



Repurchasing shares is a prepaid acquisition asset.



Holding treasury stock contains an inherent option to re-issue and the value of the option
should be treated as an asset.
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Using these five methods, this author adjusted the book values of NYSE, AmEx
and NASDAQ stocks used as inputs into Fama and French’s 3-Factor Model to explain
equity returns. Assuming any level of the Efficient Market Hypothesis holds, the method
with the greatest explanatory power reflects market participants’ collective view on the
economic essence of repurchased shares.
Research Contributions
This study is relevant to multiple literatures. Within finance, it will contribute to the
understanding of how the market interprets capital allocation decisions. Specifically, the
findings could inform the value of share repurchases beyond their signaling power. It will
also contribute to the asset pricing model literature. From an accounting perspective, the
results will inform literature regarding appropriate accounting for retired and treasury
stock transactions and also potentially inform the literature on off-balance-sheet sources
of value.
For practitioners, the results of this research could create two primary benefits. The
first is a deeper understanding of how the market interprets share buybacks, which can
inform trading surrounding repurchase announcements or actions. The second would
potentially be a small improvement in CAPM-based models that are often a source of
alpha calculations used in compensation decisions.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Several research streams address share repurchases. One stream is the role of
share repurchases in financial policy. This stream examines why companies repurchase
shares rather than pay dividends or invest in growth, how they carry out the share
repurchases, and what the company does with the repurchased shares. A second stream
examines the market impact of share repurchases – both as a signal of strong cash flows
and the potential value creation/destruction related to the repurchase activity. As a part of
this explanation, the impact share repurchases have on the book value, and the use of
book value in asset pricing models must be considered. A third stream, especially
relevant to this study, examines the theory underlying the optimal treatment of share
repurchases. Are share repurchases a return of capital, or a prepaid expense, or the
monetization of intangible assets, or a prepaid acquisition, or an option, or something
else?
Investors understand and weigh how, when, and why management decides to
repurchase their shares. Additionally, since the stock market is forward looking, investors
must also consider how the repurchased shares could be used. These general literature
themes need to be explored to understand the market impact of share repurchases.

Section 1: The Basics of Share Repurchases in the United States
Accounting Standards Codification Section 505 defines share repurchases as the
act of a company buying its shares (FASB, 2020). The process of repurchasing shares
includes three steps. First, the company must seek authorization. In the United States, a
company may repurchase its shares with the approval of the board of directors
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(McCarthy, 1999). In other countries like England, a shareholder vote is required for
authorization to repurchase shares (Sonika, Carline, & Shackleton, 2014). There are no
requirements for a company to announce the approval to its shareholders in the U.S.
Second, once authorized, management may, or may not, choose to act on the
authorization to repurchase shares. It may repurchase all, some, or none of the shares it
was authorized to repurchase. To gain the safe harbor protection of S.E.C. Rule 10b-18 2,
a company must announce the manner, price, timing, and volume of its execution in its
annual 10-K and quarterly 10-Q filings (McCarthy, 1999). Third, once a share repurchase
is completed, management must decide if the company will hold the shares in the form of
treasury stock or cancel/retire the shares (FASB, 2020), a decision evident in the financial
statements released to the market.

The Five Types of Share Repurchases
There are five methods generally utilized for repurchasing shares: fixed-price
tender offers, Dutch auction tender offers, private market transactions, open market
repurchase programs, or accelerated share repurchase programs.
A fixed-price tender offer states a single price, the number of shares sought, and
the expiration date of the offer. Typically, the price is premium to the current market
price to entice shareholders who are willing to sell to sign up for the offer rather than sell
their shares in the open market. The company will purchase the stated number of shares,
even if the offer is oversubscribed (Dann, 1981).

2

Safe Harbor rules provide the repurchasing firm legal protections from stock price manipulation charges.
For an analysis of compliance and impact see Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2003).
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A Dutch auction tender offer states a range of prices at which existing
shareholders may sign up to sell their stock, the expiration date of the offer, and the
number of shares sought in advance. The firm gathers all the minimum prices
shareholders signed up to tender and ranks them from lowest to highest. The lowest price
that will allow the company to repurchase the desired number of shares becomes the
tender price. All sellers receive the tender price (including those who would have
accepted a lower amount). The price ranges typically offered by Dutch auctions are a few
percentage points higher than the current market price, to entice shareholders to tender,
but the resulting tender price is usually lower than the fixed-price tender option
(Comment & Jarrell, 1991).
Open market purchases require a company to hire an investment bank to
repurchase shares through the secondary stock market, paying the market price at the
time of purchase. Managers may instruct the firm to start and stop repurchasing shares at
any given time without notifying investors and do not have to purchase the stated number
of shares in the authorization. According to the S.E.C.’s data, “90% of all repurchase
programs announced between 1985-1996 were to be conducted through open market
transactions” (Ikenberry & Vermaelen, 1996, p. 10).
Private market transactions are typical in smaller market capitalization stocks.
Large shareholders or former officers, who want to get rid of a large volume of stock,
offer to sell it to the company. Due to the thinly traded nature of smaller-cap stocks, large
shareholders often cannot exit significant positions quickly. Unlike the other forms of
buybacks, privately negotiated transactions are typically at or near market price (Peyer &
Vermaelen, 2005). One recent example was Wayside Technology WSTG, which agreed
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to buy out their former C.E.O. (who was suing the company to try to take back control).
The company repurchased the shares as a part of the out-of-court settlement agreement
(Wayside Technology Group, 2020).
A more recent invention is the accelerated open market repurchase program.
Here, an investment bank borrows a stated number of shares from investors (similar to a
short sale), immediately removing the shares from the market. Then, over time, the
investment bank repurchases the same number of shares in the open market and returns
them to the investors who lent shares. The investment bank and the directing company
share the gains or losses resulting from the timing difference. The result is an immediate
reduction in the number of shares outstanding and a “hard” number of shares to be
repurchased in the open market over time (Michel, Oded, & Shaked, 2010).

Current Accounting for Repurchased Shares – Treasury Stock or Retiring Shares
Once repurchased, treasury shares may be held by the company or formally
retired. Shares held in treasury have the status authorized and issued but not outstanding.
Formally retired shares have the status authorized but not issued and, therefore, also not
outstanding. Theoretically, management makes the hold in treasury versus retire decision
based on its intent of how it plans to use the stock. If the company plans to reissue the
shares for compensation or other uses, holding the shares in treasury is appropriate. If the
company has no intention of using the shares again, then it can signal this to the market
by retiring the shares. The net effect on assets (a reduction in cash) and Shareholders’
Equity is the same for either method. However, within shareholders’ equity, the treasury
stock method creates a contra-equity account, while the retirement method reduces a
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combination of common stock, paid-in capital, and retained earnings. All reductions are
based on the market value of the shares repurchased (FASB, 2020).
While the intent of the accounting for treasury stock is to create a temporary
account, Banyi and Caplan (2016) found evidence that few Delaware-based public firms
with treasury stock reduce their treasury stock holdings over time. Banyi and Caplan
suggest that this temporary account is more permanent in practice. Additionally, they
found that the average firm that uses treasury stock accounting issues new shares almost
as often as those who retire shares – which is contradictory to expectations (Banyi &
Caplan, 2016).
Data from Bloomberg (2021b) shows that approximately 65% of firms of the S&P
500 hold the repurchased shares in treasury rather than retiring the shares. Hill, Price, and
Ruch (2018) suggest that there are practical reasons for the treasury stock method’s
popularity. Until 2006, the New York Stock Exchange allowed firms to reissue treasury
stock without shareholder approval (NYSE, 2020), making it easier to use than issuing
new equity. Treasury stock is listed separately from retained earnings, which can affect
some debt covenants that require companies to maintain a certain amount of “earned
capital” (Duke & Hunt III, 1990). Additionally, Hill, Price, and Ruch (2018) find that
firms are more likely to hold the shares in treasury and not retire them to avoid dropping
retained earnings to a negative number.

Why Share Repurchases and Not Dividends
Payout policy – the term used for the distribution of cash to shareholders either
via dividends or repurchased shares – is a significant stream of literature in both
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accounting and finance. The accounting for dividends and share repurchases have the
same net effect on assets and total shareholders’ equity. So, how and why companies
choose one of the alternatives or split between the two has been studied for more than 50
years. While the evidence and market environment have changed, the underlying reasons
have remained reasonably steady – management flexibility, tax advantages, earnings
management, and debt covenants.
The Substitution Hypothesis argues that dividends and share buybacks are
interchangeable in the eyes of management. Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Jensen
(1986) provide the foundation for this hypothesis. Miller and Modigliani (1961) posit that
dividend policy is irrelevant to the price of a stock. Using the assumptions of a perfect
market and rational investors, Miller and Modigliani go through basic dividend discount,
earnings and discounted cash flow models to show the dividend policy does not affect the
value of the corporation. They go on to demonstrate that an investor should be indifferent
to a dollar of capital gains and a dollar of dividend – pointing out many holders, like
trusts, do not pay taxes. Consequently, Miller and Modigliani believe share repurchases
and dividends are substitutes.
In 1986, Michael Jensen laid out his free cash flow theory that suggests excess
cash flows create agency problems for management. Management must disgorge the
excess cash flows by either paying dividends or repurchasing shares, as they are
substitutes. Jensen, however, goes one step further and suggests companies should
borrow money and repurchase shares – using future excess cash flows to service the new
debt and thus reduce the temptation to invest future excess cash flows into money-losing
diversification ventures. Jensen prefers the borrow/repurchase scenario over the higher

Market View of Share Repurchases

17

promised dividends because it is easier to cut a dividend than to issue shares to pay off
debt. He suggests the repurchases are substitutes for dividends in the eyes of the
corporation.
Not all scholars find the substitution theory acceptable. Fama and French (2001)
suggested that dividend-paying companies repurchase shares as an additional distribution,
rather than a substitution for dividends. Research shows there are several rational reasons
why share repurchase growth has outstripped dividend growth over the past three decades
and has exceeded total cash volume since 1997 (S&P Global, 2020).
The first is management flexibility. In the United States, shareholders see the
current level of dividends as a minimum payout forever (Brigham, 1964). When a firm
cuts a dividend, the share price drops (e.g., Bessler & Nohel, 1996; Ghosh & Woolridge,
1989; Pettit, 1972; Sonika et al., 2014; Zia & Kochan, 2017). However, the same is not
true for share repurchases (Oded, 2005). Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000)
found flexibility to be a significant reason why managers prefer share repurchases. Iyer
and Rao (2017) used the 2008 financial crisis for data to test if share repurchase cuts were
punished like dividends. They found that firms that cut repurchase activities performed
better in the market than those who cut their dividends, lending strength to the concept
that share repurchases offer more management flexibility.
While investors require consistent or growing quarterly or annual dividends, what
about special dividends? One-time or special dividends do not signal an annual
commitment. However, there is evidence that investors start to anticipate special
dividends if they become a regular source of capital return. For instance, Costco issued
special dividends every nine quarters starting in 2012. When late 2019 came around,
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professional investors and journalists wrote several pieces questioning where the special
dividend was (e.g., Sparks, 2020). Consequently, this form of return to shareholders can
create an implied contract, much like ordinary dividends.
Second, share repurchases offer a tax advantage to the shareholder, but not the
corporation. The corporation must pay all dividends and share repurchases with after-tax
dollars. One financial professional, Phil Guziac of Morningstar Inc., calls dividends the
“unilateral imposition of a taxable event” (Phil Guziac, personal communication, June 1,
2020). Dividends paid out, even if immediately re-invested in the company, are a taxable
event in the year paid (Internal Revenue Service, 2020). Theoretically, share repurchases
reward continuing shareholders through capital gains instead, which allow investors to
delay the tax effects of the payout policy until they chose the sell the stock. The ability to
delay recognizing tax is a significant reason why rational shareholders may prefer share
repurchases over dividends (Elton & Gruber, 1968). This situation was obvious when
capital gains were taxed at a much lower rate than dividends (Woods & Brigham, 1966).
After qualified dividends and long-term capital gains were put on even footing under the
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, companies still favored share
repurchases over dividends (Blouin, Raedy, & Shackelford, 2011) even though an
updated preference of individuals is missing in the literature.
Third, there is evidence to suggest that managers engage in share repurchases as a
form of real earnings management. When a company repurchases shares, the total
number of shares decreases without affecting net income. Consequently, earnings per
share3 grow faster than net income. For example, Home Depot’s net income grew 77%

3

Earnings per share is defined as Net Income / Diluted Shares Outstanding
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from 2014-2019, while EPS grew 117% over the same five-year period (Home Depot,
2020). Hribar, Jenkins, and Johnson (2006) found evidence that share repurchase
activities increased when net income would have failed to meet earnings estimates –
suggesting repurchases are used in real earnings management. Burnett, Cripe, Martin, and
McAllister (2012) supported earlier findings and found that when high-quality auditing
prevents accrual-based earnings games, firms are also more likely to use accretive share
repurchases to boost earnings. In a slightly different light, Cheng, Harford, and Zhang
(2015) found that managers were more likely to buy back shares when their bonuses were
tied to earning per share targets or growth. Additionally, there is evidence that managers
increase share repurchases to offset the dilutive effect of stock option grants (Bens,
Nagar, Skinner, & Wong, 2003). These four studies combine to support the notion that
managers could favor share repurchases over dividends because of their ability to help
manage earnings per share.
Finally, debt covenants restrict some firms from paying dividends or increasing
their dividends but may allow firms to repurchase shares. Since both require a drain on
cash and a reduction in total shareholders’ equity, this may seem strange. Investors
recognized this disconnect, and it is changing. Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) studied
15,504 debt issues from 1985 to 2003. The team found that while 25.8% of issues from
1985-1989 had dividend restrictions, only 8.2% had share repurchase restrictions. As
share repurchases became more popular, there was greater parity. By the 2000-2003
period, only 16.9% of debt issuances had dividend payment restrictions, but 19.8% had
share repurchase restrictions. So, while the likelihood is shrinking, debt covenants could
explain some managers' preference of share repurchases to dividends.
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While the substitution theory expounded by Grullon and Michaely (2002), with
roots back to Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Michael Jensen (1986), suggests
dividends are share repurchases are substitutes for each other. We know that share
repurchases have increased, and the propensity to pay dividends has declined (Fama &
French, 2001). Extant literature points to four possible reasons why managers may favor
share repurchases over dividends – flexibility, tax advantages, earnings management,
and, to a much lesser extent, debt covenants.

The Uses of Repurchased Shares
With the propensity to repurchase shares established, the next avenue to explore is
what the firm does with the repurchased shares. Firms can retire the shares, hold the
shares indefinitely, reissue the shares for compensation, reissue shares as a part of a
stock-based acquisition, reissue shares as a part of a stock dividend or reissue the shares
in a seasoned equity offering.
Firms can choose to retire shares repurchased. State laws can influence this
decision by forcing companies to use the retirement method. For example, Massachusetts,
Maryland, California, Georgia, Oregon, and Washington, prohibit the use of treasury
stock, effectively requiring a firm to retire the shares upon purchase (Banyi & Caplan,
2016). Other firms hold treasury shares for a while and then choose to retire some or all
of the shares. Hill et al. (2018) showed that firms were less likely to retire shares if share
retirement resulted in negative retained earnings. In the same vein, but outside of the
United States, Latif, Mohd, and Kamardin’s (2015) study of Malaysian firms found that
smaller companies and those whose profitability is increasing are more likely to retire
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treasury stock. Once retired, the same shares may not be reissued. However, new shares
can be created and issued, resulting in virtually the same outcome.
While the treasury stock account is supposed to hold share costs until they are
either reissued or retired, there is evidence that corporations retain a certain level of
repurchased shares without retiring the shares (Banyi & Caplan, 2016). If held forever,
the result is the same as retiring the shares, but the financial statements will differ under
the two approaches. The net effect is a permanent return of capital to shareholders (Paton,
1969).
One of the most popular uses of treasury stock is to reissue the shares as a part of
stock option or restricted stock grants. As stock options became a more popular form of
compensation in the 1990s, share repurchase activity also increased. Kahle (2002) found
a positive relationship between the size of share repurchases and the number of
exercisable options in a company. Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong (2003) found that
share repurchases are tied to the issuing, not exercising of stock option grants. The
authors concluded that managers engaged in share repurchases not to provide shares for
the option grants, but to manage diluted earnings per share. Weisbenner (2000), Lee and
Alam (2004) and Lin, Yu-Chen, You and Cheng (2009) found similar earning
management results but found that exercisable (not already exercised) options had the
greatest explanatory power of share repurchase activities. All three authors stated that
managers were likely motivated by a desire not to let total shares outstanding grow. The
popularity of stock options and the volume of shares issued through this form of
compensation accounts for about half of all shares repurchased (Liang & Sharpe, 1999).
Bonaimé, Kahle, Moore, and Nemani (2019) show that the shift to restricted stock grants
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rather than options has not altered the positive relationship between the equity grants and
stock repurchases.
Firms may also issue treasury stock to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan
(ESOP) Trust. In this case, the company encourages its employees to purchase stock in
the company, either as a succession planning move for a small business, or a retirement
savings plan (Gordon & Pound, 1990). The tax advantages of using ESOPs are not as
good when using treasury stock for funding; using cash and debt would be more tax
advantageous for the firm. Additionally, the company would avoid having to pay
dividends on the treasury stock if they used the cash/debt approach for funding (Freiman,
1990).
When a company completes an acquisition, part or all of the consideration
rendered for the target shares may be shares in the acquiring company (i.e., a stock
swap). The shares swapped during acquisition can be newly authorized shares (usually a
part of the acquisition approval process) or can be shares previously held as treasury
stock. Paton (1969) suggests there is minimal difference between treasury stock and
newly created issues. Thus, using shares from treasury should serve as a convenient and
inexpensive source of shares. Interestingly, Jenkins and Ovtchinnikov (2010) found a
significant difference. Firms purchased with newly issued shares saw their stock price
decrease as the market took it as a signal of over-valuation of the stock. Firms paying in
cash, with treasury stock, or a combination of treasury stock and cash did not see the
same drop in the share price. This suggests that the market equates the use of treasury
stock much closer to the use of cash in acquisitions than newly issued shares. Like stock
options, this remains a widespread use of treasury stock. In 2006, Senior Index Analyst
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Howard Silverblatt said, “S&P believes that the greatest use [of repurchased shares] will
be for M&A” (Jenkins & Ovtchinnikov, 2010, p. 2).
Companies may use treasury stock for stock or scrip dividends. Stock dividends
are no longer popular in the U.S., as it is more of a small stock split than a return of
capital to shareholders. Some firms still argue that stock dividends are a useful tool. By
issuing a stock dividend, the firm keeps its per-share price lower. Additionally, many
recipients of the stock dividend will sell off the newly acquired shares to other investors
to get cash, hypothetically increasing the number of shareholders in the firm. Combining
the lower per-share price and a broader shareholder base, managers argue they will find it
easier to float new sales of equity to the market used to seeing new shares (Eisemann &
Moses, 1978). Scrip dividends are not precisely the same as stock dividends, as scrip
dividends give the investor a choice between a cash dividend or a similar value in stock.
This results in something closer to a small IPO rather than a stock split. Scrip dividends
are a use of treasury stock but are not available in the United States. Research in the
U.K., found scrip dividends do not save taxes, signal future prospects, or improve cash
flow (Lasfer, 1997a). Scrip dividends are also not considered substitutes for cash
dividends (Lasfer, 1997b), suggesting that they are also not a good use of treasury stock.
Finally, companies can reissue treasury stock in a seasoned equity offering. While
transactions in a company’s own shares will never result in a profit impact (Brigham,
1964), the acquisition of its shares and subsequent reissue of the shares creates an
opportunity for a company to buy low and sell high. However, there is little evidence of a
company’s actual ability to generate profits this way. There does appear though to be
some benefits to repurchasing shares and then reissuing them. Bond and Zhong (2016)
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found that when companies engage in a seasoned equity offering, the price of the stock
does not drop as much when the company had previously repurchased its shares than
when it had not. The subsequent performance of the stock does not result in any abnormal
return (Abdou & Gupta, 2019).
With a variety of methods to buy, report, and use share repurchases, forwardlooking investors should weigh the likelihood of each when determining a market impact
of a share repurchase. This study will investigate if adjusting the book value to reflect the
various uses is mirrored in the movements of the stock price.

Section 2: The Market Impact of Share Repurchases
The finance and accounting literatures include much research related to the
market impact of share repurchases. The literatures have identified several sources of
market impact including market signaling, market timing, the relationship between share
repurchases and insider trading, and the subsequent market performance of firms after
announcing and executing a share repurchase plan.

Signaling in Share Repurchases
In 1977, Stephen Ross was one of five scholars (Bhattacharya, 1979; Brealey,
Leland, & Pyle, 1977) who postulated that since firm insiders possess more knowledge
than outsiders, financial structure decisions act as a signal to the market that the firm is
undervalued. This signaling theory was quickly applied to share repurchases. Vermaelen
(1981) found a positive relationship between the size of the buybacks and the increase in
share price on the day of the announcement. Dann (1981) found share price increases the
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day share repurchase plans are announced. This benefits current shareholders as the
announcement (compared to the act) signals undervaluation. A decade later, Comment
and Jarrell (1991) compared three methods of share repurchases – Open Market, Dutch
auction, and Fixed-Price Tender offers. They found the fixed-price tender offer
announcement gave the strongest positive signal to the market, resulting in the largest
return the day it was announced. The results are logical and consistent with signaling
theory, as a fixed-price tender offer is the only one that gives a firm price the company is
willing to repurchase shares at – lending insight into the firm’s self-valuation. Fixedpriced tender offers had a median 16% premium over pre-announcement price, while
Dutch auction offers result in a median 12.5% premium (Ikenberry & Grullon, 2000).
Dutch auctions provide a stronger signal to the market than open market repurchase
plans, which have no incremental pricing disclosure beyond the current market price
(Comment & Jarrell, 1991).
Open market offers may be weakest because of fear of completion. Firms can
announce share repurchase plans, but then not execute them (Ikenberry & Vermaelen,
1996). Bonaimé (2012) found that firms can create a reputation for either completing or
not completing their announced repurchase plans. When firms do not reliably use their
announced authorization, the signaling power of a new announcement is significantly
weaker than firms with a history of completion. However, firms worried about their prior
signaling can announce an accelerated share repurchase plan to mitigate the completion
fear and strengthen the signal of the repurchase announcement (Bonaimé, 2012).
Whatever repurchase method a company chooses, there has been consistent
evidence that merely the announcement of a repurchase plan – the signal that the firm

Market View of Share Repurchases

26

believes its shares are a bargain – is enough to move the stock price up the day it is
released. Open market program day-of returns average between 2% and 4%, depending
on the period measured (Grullon & Michaely, 2002, 2004). Fixed price tender-offers
result in excess stock returns of 11% around the three days of and after the
announcement, while Dutch auction offers result in an 8% excess return (Comment &
Jarrell, 1991).

Market Timing of Share Repurchases
Moving beyond the announcement, the next question to answer is, do managers
time the market when making their share repurchases? Brav, Graham, Harvey, and
Michaely’s (2005) survey showed that 80% of corporations initiate a share repurchase
plan when they believe the stock is a good investment compared to alternatives,
suggesting market timing. Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) argued that managers
repurchase their stock when it is undervalued and would refuse to repurchase shares
when their stock is overvalued, again suggesting that managers can time the market.
Assuming the managers can time the market, then each company should be able to earn
abnormal returns following the share repurchase as the market corrects the mispricing.
Note, these articles were published prior to the major stock repurchase booms of recent
years. More recent findings are mixed, with Gunn (2017) finding only small and midsized firms show evidence of positive timing, while large firms do not.
However, Fama (1998), Brav and Gompers (1997), and Mitchell and Stafford
(2000) suggest that the methodology employed by researchers like Ikenberry and
Vermaelen (1996) is flawed. These papers concluded there are problems with appropriate
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benchmarks and how to measure the abnormal return required to show market timing can
be misleading. Additionally, Schultz (2003) hypothesized the existence of pseudo-market
timing concerning I.P.O.s but could also exist for share repurchases. Pseudo-market
timing is the appearance of market under/over-performance after a corporate finance
decision because managers base their decisions on past stock market performance. The
evidence of market timing disappears when calendar-time returns replace event-time
methods (Schultz, 2003). Following Schulz’s hypothesis, Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee
(2007) used calendar-time methodology and continued to find evidence of actual market
timing and no evidence of pseudo-market timing.

The Link Between Share Repurchases and Insider Trading
Based on the idea that managers time the market when repurchasing shares and
can use the same knowledge when trading the same stock for their portfolio. It would
seem logical to find a significant link between insider trading and share repurchase
activity. Nevertheless, Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2012) found that insiders were
more likely to sell after announcing a repurchase program, even after controlling for
option-related selling. Bonaimé and Ryngaert (2013) confirmed that the results in the
other direction; the odds of high net repurchases are greater when insiders are selling, not
buying stocks. These conflicting signals result in mixed messaging for the market and
result in the market ignoring the positive signaling of the share repurchases. However,
when both insiders and the firm are net buyers (resulting in two signals, both suggesting
the stock is undervalued), the signal is powerful. It results in significantly higher returns
in the quarter of the repurchase activity and the following three years.
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Both studies above looked at simultaneous signals. Cziraki, Lyandres, and
Michaely (2019) studied insider trading and share repurchases on a lagged basis and
discovered that insiders tend to be net buyers before open market repurchase plans are
announced, and net sellers before seasoned equity offerings (which typically drive the
stock price down) are announced. Babenko, Tserlukevich, and Vedrashko (2012) found
that when C.E.O.s purchase stock before announcing an open market share repurchase
program, the signaling power of the program announcement is more robust, resulting in a
larger bump to share price.

Post-Repurchase Firm Performance
Having looked at market returns on the day-of announcement (signals) and when
executed (market timing), researchers have also studied the long-term effects of share
repurchases on firm performance. There have been two main definitions of performance
– operating performance measured in various income statement related metrics and
market performance measured as cumulative abnormal stock returns.
Operationally, share repurchases allow earnings per share to grow faster than net
income, creating the “EPS bump” (Ikenberry & Grullon, 2000). An EPS bump assumes
that whatever funding mechanism it uses (idle cash or borrowings) does not decrease
earnings a larger percentage than the share count falls. While this does not improve
operations, it may affect the share price, assuming a constant multiple (Ikenberry &
Grullon, 2000).
A popular metric to judge abnormal operational returns is increases in return on
assets. There are two hypotheses related to improved return on assets. First, using excess
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cash to repurchase stock puts an idle or under-performing asset to use in its highest return
(Wansley, Lane, & Sarkar, 1989), reducing total assets while not impacting net income,
resulting in a higher return on assets. The second hypothesis is that management
purposefully manipulates earnings before the share repurchase. By using excess accruals,
management can temporarily reduce operating profit before the repurchase
announcement, only to show improvement after the announcement. Gong, Louis, and Sun
(2008) found evidence of abnormal accruals the quarter-before and quarter-of a new
repurchase plan announcement, which resulted in post-repurchase operational
improvement in the one and two-year periods when the accruals reverted to normal
levels. Chen and Huang (2013) looked at similar evidence five years later and determined
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) was able to limit this management manipulation. Using a longterm data set divided into Pre- and Post-SOX, the duo confirmed Gong et al.’s results for
Pre-SOX manipulation, but saw the abnormal accruals disappear Post-SOX.
Long-term firm outperformance due to share repurchases has been a hotly
contested set of finance literature over the past 30 years. The idea of cumulative
abnormal returns (C.A.R.) goes against the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Peyer &
Vermaelen, 2009). Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) found not only an
initial bump in the stock price after open market repurchases discussed earlier (signaling)
but a lasting effect. Firms who repurchased shares reported abnormal stock returns of
2.9% annually over the four years following the announcements. Using Fama and
French’s Book-to-Market ratio as a proxy, the authors found that value stocks earned a
6.4% annual abnormal return over four-year periods. The same researchers followed up
their study five years later (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, & Vermaelen, 2000) with new data
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(1990s Canadian data vs. 1980s U.S. data) and came to similar conclusions. Other
researchers have found similar supporting evidence (e.g., Gong et al., 2008; Lie, 2005;
Peyer & Vermaelen, 2005). Using a different metric (buy and hold returns vs. C.A.R.),
Chan et al. (2007) also found abnormal performance for up to four years after repurchase
announcements using data that spanned 1980 to 1990.
In 2009, Peyer and Vermaelen re-tested the evidence from above to see if it
persists as Efficient Market Hypothesis proponents suggest that anomalies should
disappear after they are well-advertised. Additionally, they calculated the outperformance
metrics three different ways to address concerns that C.A.R. and Buy and Hold metrics
were fundamentally flawed. They found continued support that before repurchase
announcements, stock prices are un-justifiably beat down and that management takes
advantage of this relative underpricing when repurchasing shares. Using data from 1991
to 2001, they find cumulative abnormal returns of 24.25% after four years. Peyer and
Vermaelen found that with alternative measures, like calendar-weighted results, the
outperformance decreases somewhat, but remained statistically significant and positive.
McNally and Smith (2007) also confirmed the cumulative abnormal returns for
firms who repurchased shares in the Canadian market but found that when adding in
transaction costs, individual investor trading strategies did not yield abnormal returns.
The two found median abnormal returns of the firm’s actions of 3.31% after one year and
4.22% after two years but found when an individual attempted to capture the same
additional returns by purchasing shares immediately after the announcement; transaction
costs ate up enough of the return to wipe out the excess return.
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All the previously discussed returns are based on open market repurchase plans.
Michel et al. (2010) looked specifically at post-repurchase market performance for the
increasingly popular accelerated stock repurchase method. They did not find the same
post-repurchase price drift as earlier researchers did for other forms of repurchasing.
Using 15 days post announcement to 9 months later, the average C.A.R. was -8.5%
relative to its value on Day 15 after the announcement, using data from 2004-2007,
suggesting value destruction.
Finally, Abdou and Gupta (2019) explored whether the announced purpose of the
share buyback would affect the cumulative abnormal return. The team ended up finding it
did not. Interestingly, they also found that all repurchase techniques (open market, fixedprice tender, Dutch auction, or accelerated repurchase), negatively contributed to
cumulative abnormal returns when controlling for company size, risk, and revenue. It is
unclear if the efficient market has finally eliminated the excess return from earlier data
sets or prior research confused correlation with causation.
While the theories about the how and the why are mixed and the size of the
impact have potentially changed, adding up all the research suggests that the growing
share repurchase activity does impact accounting metrics and share price.

Section 3: The Role of Book Value Per Share in Firm Valuation Models
The number of shares outstanding and book value of a company are factors in
most models of firm value and market performance. Since share repurchases affect the
reported diluted shares outstanding and book value of the corporation, we must
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understand the role of book value per share in these models to understand the impact
share repurchase accounting and activities have on theory and practice.

Capital Structure on the Value of the Firm
In 1958, Modigliani and Miller (M&M) published their widely cited theorem that
capital structure is irrelevant to the value of the firm. The underlying assumptions
allowed for a simplified theory (i.e., no transaction costs and that individuals and
corporations can borrow at the same cost). Consequently, various capital structure
theories emerged to adjust M&M’s theory to include the impact of taxes related to debt
and equity securities at the individual and corporate levels (e.g., Modigliani, 1982), the
cost of financial distress (e.g., Kim, 1978; Scott Jr, 1977), agency costs (e.g., Jensen &
Meckling, 1979) and tax shields on non-interest items like accelerated depreciation (e.g.,
DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) combined these items to
support Trade-Off Theory. They conclude optimal debt levels – those that will maximize
the value of the firm -- increase as the cost of financial distress (both agency and
bankruptcy risk) decreases. Optimal leverage is also inversely related to the amount of
non-debt tax shields. Managers must balance the risk of financial distress with the tax
savings of additional debt. However, Trade-Off Theory does not appear to hold over
extended periods. For example, the theory would suggest that as the cost of financial
distress increases, debt would fall. However, long-run leverage ratios have been mostly
static from 1900 to 2002, despite swings in economic health and cost of bankruptcy and
debt (Frank & Goyal, 2008).
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An alternative to Trade-Off Theory is the Pecking Order Theory (Myers &
Majluf, 1984). This theory suggests that debt is issued (increasing leverage) due to
internal cash demands that cannot be met by internally generated cash and because it is
cheaper than equity. Pecking Order Theory states that immediate internal concerns, rather
than a goal of an elusive optimal debt ratio, drive capital structure. Shyam Sunder and
Myers (1999) demonstrate that the Pecking Order Theory appears to explain corporate
actions better when a financial deficit is present than Trade-Off Theory. However, the
theory can break down, and analysts can reject it when firms choose to issue equity over
debt, which happens frequently (Frank & Goyal, 2003).
Since both significant theoretical streams have short comings, there is no unifying
capital structure theory that can explain all firm actions. While imperfect, both conclude
that capital structure can impact the value of the firm. To adjust capital structure quickly,
a firm can issue or pay off debt, or issue or buy back shares. Consequently, one can
assume that share buybacks, which alter the leverage ratio, will impact the value of the
firm due to the impact on the capital structure of the firm.

Capital Asset Pricing Models
There are dozens of theoretical models for valuation. They generally fall into a
couple of categories – discounted flows-based models (discounted dividends, discounted
free cash flows, and discounted abnormal earnings), multiples-based models (price as a
multiple of accounting measures including but not limited to earnings, book value,
EBITDA, and revenues), and capital asset pricing models. Number of shares outstanding
and/or book values are critical to the output of all of these models, and their estimates of
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value will be highly correlated. This dissertation focuses on capital asset pricing models
because of their wide acceptance as theoretical pricing models and their use of marketdriven valuation in conjunction with some accounting to obtain a return.
Sharpe-Lintner-Black CAPM
The most high-profile pricing model is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
This model was developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972). The
model, shown below, assumes individual corporate returns are a function of their risk
relative to the overall market (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005) 4.
rjt – rft = αj + βjt(rmt – rft)+ϵjt
The impact of share repurchases is not readily apparent in the CAPM model in its
original form. When share repurchases are used to change the capital structure of the
company, however, the risk level of equity compared to the market will change, which
will affect the beta of the CAPM formula.
Fama-French 3-Factor Model
Fama and French (1993) presented a 3-Factor version of CAPM to enhance its
explanatory power, displayed below.

The original beta on the market risk premium was maintained. The SMB term represents
small-minus-big (the difference in monthly average returns of small companies based on
market capitalization to large companies based on market cap). This factor compensates
for the size effects witnessed in the market. According to Fama and French (1995), small

4

For an explanation of the inputs, mechanics, and uses of CAPM, see Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2005).
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firms in the 1980s showed lower returns on assets than large firms, even when controlling
for other factors. Consequently, small firms must share some common risk factor that
adds explanatory power of their stock returns.
The second new factor was high-minus-low (HML). Firms with high book value
to market value of equity have a low stock price relative to their book value per share.
This lower stock price reflects lower earnings expectations on the book equity (Fama &
French, 1995). On the flip side, low BE/ME firms have higher earnings power on their
book equity. In short, low BE/ME firms tend to be growth stocks while high BE/ME
firms are often financially distressed firms (Fama & French, 1995) or value firms (Davis,
Fama, & French, 2000).
Note that Fama and French (1992) stated: “We do not use negative-BE firms,
which are rare before 1980, when calculating the breakpoint for BE/ME or when forming
the size-BE/ME portfolios” (p.8), later stating these firms show signs of financial distress
(Fama & French, 1995). This omission is critical, as more and more companies have low
or negative shareholders’ equity as a result of share repurchases and are not financially
distressed. Indeed, it is the opposite in several cases. The negative book value firms are
firms that have used significant positive cash from operations over several years to buy
back shares. As of April 6, 2021, applying Fama and French’s Model using their
methodology will exclude 23 members of the S&P 500 (Bloomberg, 2021a), and
potentially reduce its explanatory power. Considering Fama and French (2004) state that
the HML factor “does the heavy lifting in the improvements to the CAPM” (p.40), the
potential reduction in its explanatory power is problematic.
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The application and explanatory power of the Fama-French Model, when applied
in the original method, is robust. In 1993, Fama and French reported R 2 ranging from
0.82 to 0.97 depending on the portfolio measured when looking at U.S. Stocks from July
1963 to December 1991. In 2000, Davis, Fama, and French use the Model on NYSE
listed stocks and compared periods between July 1929 and June 1997. The results show
that the 3-Factor Model has an R2 between 0.90 and 0.98, depending on the period and
portfolio. In yet another test on North American stocks from November 1990 to March
2011, the R2 continued to be a strong 0.93 when regressed against only local factors
(Fama & French, 2012). This consistently strong result suggests the 3-Factors do help
explain price volatility. However, the impact of the rapidly changing book values per
share due to share repurchases has yet to be explored, and the possible adjustments
outlined below may bring the Model even stronger results.

Section 4: Five Views of Repurchased Shares
The generally accepted accounting treatment for share repurchases and treasury
stock has been mostly stable for several decades. However, historically there was some
variation. According to Fjeld (1936), 221 of the 404 NYSE listed firms with treasury
stock in 1932 classified at least part of their holdings as assets. This practice was partially
a strategy to avoid the reduction in shareholders’ equity (Rueschhoff, 1978). The current
treatment was driven by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) as much as the
financial accounting regulators. The I.R.S. decided on the current accounting method that
treats share repurchases as a return on capital. In 1933, the I.R.S. changed its rules and
suggested that any difference in price between the purchase and sale of treasury stock
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was income to the corporation. This rule resulted in most companies retiring their
treasury stock and merely issuing new shares when needed, no longer labeling the
repurchased shares as assets. Twenty years later, the I.R.S. reversed its stance and
stopped labeling the reissue as income, but verified it was an owner’s equity transactions,
which mainly stuck. By 1975, only 5 of 600 companies accounted for treasury shares –
specifically for the reissue related to stock options – as an asset (Rueschhoff, 1978).
Today, share repurchases, retired or held as treasury stock, are considered a reduction in
shareholders’ equity.

Share Repurchases are a Return of Capital
Paton argued that share repurchases are a return of capital to shareholders as early
as 1919, but he addressed the issue again 50 years later (Paton, 1969). Paton posits that
repurchased shares are economically equivalent to shares that have never been issued.
Even when ultimately reissued, there is no meaningful difference to newly created shares.
Repurchased shares have no voting rights or dividend rights – the same as authorized, but
not issued shares. The accounting for both should be consistent. Paton rejected the notion
that there is any asset value to be shown on the balance sheet related to the option to
reissue by pointing out that it is equivalent to a bank line of credit that a company can
establish. The potential cash from a bank line of credit does not appear until the company
draws on the line; the same should be true for repurchased shares.
Assuming repurchased shares are a return on capital also evens the playing field
between treasury and retired shares. While individual line items vary, the net effect on
total assets and total shareholders’ equity remains the same between retired shares and
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treasury shares (Banyi & Caplan, 2016). As a company retains the right to reissue
treasury shares or issue new shares to replace the retired shares, this consistent
accounting of equivalent maneuvers is optimal.
Finally, share repurchases are viewed as substitutes for dividends as both are a use
of cash that goes directly to shareholders (Grullon & Michaely, 2002). This rationale
supports the existing accounting methodology and leads to the first hypothesis.

H1: The market treats share repurchases as a return of capital to shareholders, such
that the current accounting methods without adjustment will have the greatest
explanatory power in the Fama-French 3-Factor Model.

Share Repurchases are a Prepaid Cash Expense
The basic definition of an asset in accounting is “probable future economic
benefits obtained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of past transactions or
events” (Weygandt, Kimmel, & Kieso, 2015, p. 48). Share repurchases bought with the
intent to reissue as a form of compensation fits this definition. Companies control
treasury shares after using cash (a past transaction) and expect to economically benefit
the corporation in the form of the efforts and retention of the employees paid via stock.
It is the intent of management that makes the acquisition of shares an asset
(Horwitz & Young, 1975). Equity compensation is also a significant use of the
repurchased form. Liang and Sharpe (1999) estimated that about half of repurchased
shares are reissued for stock options. As stated earlier, Bonaimé et al. (2019) show that
the shift to restricted stock grants rather than options has not altered the positive
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relationship between the equity grants and stock repurchases. Consequently, this portion
of share repurchases bought with the intent to reissue as compensation appear to meet the
AICPA’s rules surrounding assets.
Accounting for stock options is a complicated issue (Hall, 2000). Stock option
expense is a non-cash charge based on the Black-Scholes-Merton or Lattice option
pricing model (Baril, Betancourt, & Briggs, 2007). It is reversed in adjustments in cash
flow from operations because it is a non-cash expense in that period (Weygandt et al.,
2015). However, most companies use cash to buy back shares and then award at least a
portion of those treasury shares to their employees. Bens et al. (2003) found the market
impact of shares repurchased to fulfill employee stock options occur when the stock
options are issued to the employee rather than when the options are exercised by the
employee. Hence, the market assigns a high probability to their ultimate exercise. There
is a real cash outlay behind the expense. The fact that these are two separate transactions
does not negate the real cash outflow. By reversing the “non-cash” charge for stock
option expense and instead recognizing the cash outlay and accompanying inflow from
exercise in cash flow from financing, existing accounting overstates both cash flow from
operations and free cash flow. Kahle (2002) found evidence that the market reacts less
favorably to share repurchase announcements when a company has a large volume of
stock options outstanding – a signal that the market may see through the accounting.
To adjust for the cash nature of stock compensation, analysts can make the
following adjustments. First, the portion of share repurchases that offset stock grants
could be moved from a negative contra-equity account to an asset account – current or
long-term depending on expiration, at cost. This adjustment would effectively raise book
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value of equity temporarily until the real expense is recognized through in the income
statement – which will eventually flow into retained earnings. These adjustments are not
a part of existing accounting but may reflect how the market thinks about share
repurchases.

H2: The market treats share repurchases as a pre-paid cash expense, such that
recording repurchased shares as an asset valued at the net cash of unexercised stock
options, with a corresponding increase to book value will have the greatest explanatory
power in the Fama-French 3-Factor Model.

Repurchasing Shares is the Monetization of Internally Generated Goodwill
When initially justifying the asset treatment of treasury stock, Bentley (1911) and
Montgomery (1912) noted that the transactions required firms to spend cash for an object
that could be sold (had monetary value) or retained by the firm at the firm’s option. Since
there was real value related to the repurchased share, it was viewed as an asset (Sheldahl,
1982). This treatment was popular until the 1930s when legal restrictions were put in
place that limited distributions beyond current retained earnings (Rueschhoff, 1978). This
notion generally did not find favor with the accounting profession (Paton, 1969).
Behind the idea that a repurchased share has value is the assumption that the
company is a going concern with a profitable future. The company merely decides the
best use of its money is not to buy a new piece of equipment or hire a new employee, but
to invest it into its stock, similar to any other acquisition (Paton, 1969). If one looks at a
repurchased share as a partial acquisition of itself, several interesting implications arise.
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The most significant implication is the potential to recognize goodwill. Internally
generated intangible assets are not capitalized under generally accepted accounting
principles. Only when a company is sold will identified intangible assets be written up to
their fair value and/or goodwill be recognized. Each are part of the cost basis of the
acquiring company (Weygandt et al., 2015). In a sign of recognizing that goodwill can, in
many instances, have an indefinite useful life, the FASB discontinued the amortization of
goodwill in 2001 (Statement 142, 2020). 5 Goodwill and appreciated intangible assets
(e.g., Sinclair & Keller, 2014; Corrado, Hulten & Sichel, 2009), are not reported on the
balance sheet. But, when a company repurchases its shares, it is acquiring a small portion
of a going concern – a partial acquisition, usually at a value higher than book value.
Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009) posit that unrecognized goodwill meets all the criteria
of intangible capital – since it was created through investment to yield future returns. A
share repurchase is thus a combination of a return of accounting recognized capital (book
value) to shareholders and a related recognition of internally generated goodwill (Zhang,
2013). As with other forms of goodwill, the new intangible asset is subject to impairment
tests and should be written-off when its fair value is less than its value in the financial
statements.

H3: The market views share repurchases as a de facto partial acquisition of the firm
and the monetization of internally generated goodwill such that the adjustment is the
recognition of the cost of repurchased shares in excess of the book value as an

5

The adoption and procedures in SFAS 142 resulted from a significant amount of political influence on the
independent accounting standards setting board. For a good review of the background related to this
standard see Ramanna (2008).
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intangible subject to impairment testing. H3 posits that this adjustment will have the
greatest explanatory power in the Fama-French 3-Factor Model.

Repurchasing Shares is a Prepaid Cash Acquisition Asset
In 1975, Horwitz and Young argued that the intent of management should be
considered when determining the accounting treatment of share repurchases. One
intended use of repurchased shares is the acquisition of other companies. Exxon Mobil
has explicitly stated such an intent, buying shares over the years, storing them in treasury
stock, and then reissuing them when it finds an attractive acquisition (Sanati, 2009).
Evidence shows that the market treats acquisitions made with treasury shares like cash
rather than stock-based acquisitions (Jenkins & Ovtchinnikov, 2010). With this economic
equivalency to cash, shares repurchased for the intent to reissue to acquire another
company should be treated as a cash equivalent.

H4: The market views share repurchases as a prepaid acquisition, such that recording
repurchased shares as a cash equivalent asset of the firm, with a corresponding
increase to book value will have the greatest explanatory power in the Fama-French 3Factor Model.

Treasury Stock is a Put Option on Company Shares
Until retired, companies can reissue treasury shares for a variety of purposes,
including compensation, acquisition, and seasoned equity offerings, most of which are at
or near current market value (Bond & Zhong, 2016; Jenkins & Ovtchinnikov, 2010;
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Liang & Sharpe, 1999). In other words, the company has the economic equivalent of a
put option at market price with no expiration date. While most of the funds used in the
repurchase program are a return on capital, the company retains this option value, which
should be recorded on the asset side of the balance sheet.

H5: The market recognizes the embedded option inherent in a firm’s decision to
repurchase shares. Consequently, the company retains the option value to reissue the
shares, at or near the current market price, which, when recorded as an asset and a
corresponding increase to book value, will have the greatest explanatory power in the
Fama-French 3-Factor Model.

These five hypotheses were based on prior evidence. When a firm decides to
repurchase shares, it must make several choices, all of which can affect its stock price
differently. The firm must choose how to repurchase the shares and how to record the
repurchase on their books. Then, a firm has many choices of what to do with the
repurchased shares – many of which can signal to the market something about the
prospects of the company. This dissertation attempts to use the Fama-French 3-Factor
Model to bring all of these possibilities together and find evidence of how the market
interprets these management choices.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
This study has two primary steps. The first is to make the adjustments to the book
values of the S&P 500 to reflect the various hypothesized treatments of share
repurchases. The second step is to estimate the Fama-French 3-Factor model based on the
adjusted book values.

The Sample
The final sample-set used in this study is all NYSE, Nasdaq and AmEx listed
stocks from 1994 to 2019. While share buybacks have been a topic of conversation for
more than 100 years, less than 30% of companies used share buybacks in any form in
1980. This usage rate dropped to a low of 25% by 1992-1993, before rapidly growing in
popularity. In 1997, share repurchases first exceeded dividends on a dollar basis and
number of companies and that has mostly been the case since (Zeng & Luk, 2020). Thus,
data from 1994 forward is used in this study.

The Adjustments to Book Value
Four of the five treatments of share repurchases require adjustments to book value per
current U.S. GAAP. This section will go into detail and use McDonald’s 2019’s balance
sheet as an example for each adjustment. Table 1 shows all the inputs and results of the
adjustments for three companies with different financial situations. This study chose
McDonald’s because its heavy use of share repurchases reduced its total shareholders’
equity to negative. MasterCard is aggressive with share repurchases but still has positive
shareholders’ equity. Finally, Lowe’s repurchases a significant number of shares, but it
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retires the shares rather than holding the stock as treasury stock. The multiple examples
shown demonstrate that companies’ accounting and strategic decisions impact their book
values in different ways, which should result in different book-to-market value rankings
depending on the hypothesis tested.

H1: The market treats share repurchases as a return of capital to shareholders, such that
the current accounting methods without adjustment will have the greatest explanatory
power in the Fama-French 3-Factor Model.
This hypothesis uses current accounting standards. No adjustments are necessary.
For our example company, McDonald’s, its FY 2019 book value was ($8.213) billion,
with a market-cap on December 31, 2019, of $147.476 billion, rendering the book-tomarket value (-.056) meaningless, as it will drop out of the sample set.

H2: The market treats share repurchases as a pre-paid cash expense, such that recording
repurchased shares as an asset valued at the net cash of unexercised stock options, with a
corresponding increase to book value will have the greatest explanatory power in the
Fama-French 3-Factor Model.
Since Bens et al. (2003) found that share repurchases are tied to the issuing, not
exercising of stock option grants, this study chose to base the value of the asset on the
total number of stock options issued, rather than exercised. This choice will slightly
inflate the number as not all issued options will be exercised. A practitioner study by
Charles Schwab found that 76% of recipients of stock options never exercised them.
However, it should be noted that this finding skewed by the many individuals that receive
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small stock grants (O'Brien, 2018). In the sample company, McDonald’s, 500,000 shares,
or 3% of stock options and RSUs were either forfeited or expired unexercised during the
2019 fiscal year (McDonald's Inc, 2020).
The adjustment to book value would create a new asset called “Treasury Stock
Held for Equity Compensation.” Support for this adjustment comes from the McDonald’s
2020 10-K stated which stated, “the Company uses treasury shares purchased under the
Company’s share repurchase program to satisfy share-based exercises” (p.53). The asset
amount is calculated using a non-cumulative LIFO method (meaning it would be recalculated every year in the sample).
While it would be better in practice to create a system where options granted in
year t were matched with repurchases made in the same year, company disclosures
concerning stock option exercise do not provide sufficient detail to enable such matching.
The remaining options are the LIFO, FIFO, and weighted-average cost assumptions.
LIFO is the choice of this study because it has the advantage of finding data for
companies that subsequently retire the shares. Additionally, using the most recent data
helps when an acquisition or spin-off results in substantial changes to the number of
options outstanding. However, note that since share prices tend to rise over time, the
value of the prepaid asset will likely be higher than the preferred matching method. Any
repurchased shares not needed to fund equity compensation will remain recorded under
the existing accounting treatment.
FIFO suffers from the inability to trace what shares were “used up” and what is
left and would require an arbitrary starting point for creating the treasury balance. The
weighted-average cost method is an attractive alternative and easy to calculate in firms
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that have treasury stock. Treasury stock is a fungible item, without expiration, leading
strength to this treatment. Interestingly, due to the strong market over the past ten years,
the weighted average price of treasury stock can be below the average strike price of
stock options. This scenario creates an unusual situation where the company is making a
non-income statement capital gain when the options are exercised. However, in order to
apply a weighted average method to companies that retire repurchased shares will require
additional assumptions, including how long to create a pool of stock that would not be
required for LIFO.
To calculate the book value adjustment, the study uses fiscal year end stock
options and restricted stock units issued, but not exercised. Using average stock prices
over the fiscal year as a proxy for repurchase price for FY t and working backwards, the
study records the average cost of satisfying those issued grants with treasury stock. The
value of the asset is the repurchase price minus the exercise price of the option. 6 The
resulting adjustment would be a debit to increase the asset “Treasury Stock Held for
Equity Compensation” asset and a credit to eliminate the Treasury Stock contra-equity
amount. This adjustment serves to raise book value.

Treasury Stock Held for Equity Compensation
Treasury Stock

XXXX

Treasury Stock Held for Equity Compensation
Common Stock
Retained Earnings

XXXX

XXXX

OR
XXXX
XXXX

For example, in FY19, McDonald’s had 16.0 million shares reserved for issued,
but not exercised options (14.6 million with a weighted average strike price of $124.21).

6

Note: this study ignores the tax implications, which would just be a timing difference rather than an
economic difference.
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In 2019, the company repurchased 19.6 million shares with an average price of $198.28
(McDonald's Inc., 2020). Consequently, the LIFO-based treasury stock average price to
cover the 16.0 million shares would be $198.28. The pre-paid asset would then be:
(198.28-124.21) * 14.6 options = $1.081 billion. This new asset would increase total
assets and shareholders’ equity, leaving McDonald’s with a book value of ($7.132)
billion and the same market capitalization of $147.48 billion, giving the company a bookto-market value of -0.0483.

H3: The market views share repurchases as a de facto partial acquisition of the firm and
the monetization of internally generated goodwill such that the adjustment is the
recognition of the cost of repurchased shares in excess of the book value as an intangible
subject to impairment testing. H3 posits that this adjustment will have the greatest
explanatory power in the Fama-French 3-Factor Model.
To calculate the asset of internally generated goodwill, this study will use Zhang’s
(2013) method as follows:
Intangible Asset 12/31/t = [Market Value 12/31/t – Book Value FYt].7
This formula will generate a total value for internally generated goodwill that will need to
be reduced to the percentage of shares repurchased compared to issued. For company’s
using the treasury stock method, applying the percentage of treasury shares available on
the balance sheet to total shares issued will provide the needed percentages. For
companies that choose to retire their shares, this study will take the net difference
between the number of shares outstanding at t0 and t-8 as a percentage of shares at t-8. Any

7

Ideally, the model would use the fair value of identifiable net assets rather than book values. However,
without the ability to revalue the assets on a company’s balance sheet, this is the best alternative available.
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reduction is considered net share repurchases, and that percentage is applied. Note that
the number of shares outstanding at t-8 will be adjusted for any subsequent stock splits.
This metric implicitly assumes that any stock-based acquisition was the result of reissuing formerly retired shares when the difference is still positive. Companies with a
higher share count at n0 will have no adjustments made.

Internally Generated Goodwill
Treasury Stock

XXXX

Internally Generated Goodwill
Common Stock
Retained Earnings

XXXX

XXXX

OR
XXXX
XXXX

The t-8 cut off is a research design judgment. No previous literature was found
that made these sorts of adjustments. Consequently, the average economic cycle during
the period studied is used as the time horizon. According to the National Bureau of
Economic Research, there were five complete economic cycles between 1979-2019,
making it an average of 8 years (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020). If 8
years is too brief of a time horizon, the buyback activity of the firm will be understated.
If 8 years is too high, a significant acquisition would result in a longer than necessary
zero balance for internally generated goodwill.
McDonald’s had a total market capitalization of $157.7 billion and a book value
of ($8.21) billion, resulting in the internally generated goodwill of $165.91 billion. At
fiscal year end, the company’s treasury stock account holds 914.3 million of the 1,660.6
million shares issued or 55%. These figures result in an internally generated goodwill
asset value of $91.35 billion, increasing its book value to $83.13 billion, and making its
book-to-market value 0.526.
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H4: The market views share repurchases as a prepaid acquisition, such that recording
repurchased shares as a cash equivalent asset of the firm, with a corresponding increase
to book value will have the greatest explanatory power in the Fama-French 3-Factor
Model.
This method is simple, rather than recording treasury stock at cost in a contraequity account, treasury stock is treated as an asset, at lower of cost or market value. The
short-term asset would be subject to impairment tests, which would be required if the
market value of the shares was less than the book value recorded. Consequently, when
recording this asset, the asset would be the lesser of the recorded treasury stock book
value or the number of shares multiplied by the share price at year-end.
Based on this assumption, adjustments are required for companies that choose to
retire their shares. To find the net number of shares repurchased, the same calculation as
for the prior hypothesis is applied (i.e., take the difference between n 0 and n-8 shares
outstanding). This number of shares is multiplied by the weighted average repurchase
price over the same 8-year period, proxied as the average share price in the year of
repurchase. This process generates an approximation of the book value of retired shares.
Like the treasury share adjustment, this book value will be subject to an impairment test
equal to the number of net repurchased shares calculated multiplied by the year end share
price.

Treasury Stock Asset
Treasury Stock

XXXX

Treasury Stock Asset
Common Stock
Retained Earnings

XXXX

XXXX

OR
XXXX
XXXX
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The cost of McDonald’s treasury stock was $66.33 billion in FY19. With 914.3
million shares of treasury stock and a share price of $197.61, the hypothetical value of
the stock is $180.7 billion. This result suggests the book value is not impaired, and the
$66.33 billion can be recorded as an asset in this adjustment. Adding the $66.33 billion to
the ($8.21) billion book value creates an adjusted book value of $58.12 billion. This
adjustment increases the book-to-market value to 0.369.

H5: The market recognizes the embedded option inherent in a firm’s decision to
repurchase shares. Consequently, the company retains the option value to reissue the
shares, at or near the current market price, which, when recorded as an asset and a
corresponding increase to book value, will have the greatest explanatory power in the
Fama-French 3-Factor Model.
Using the Black-Scholes-Merton Option Pricing Model and the assumptions the
companies make to value their stock options, as disclosed in the notes to the financial
statements, the put option value can be calculated for the potential to reissue treasury
stock. While the other four hypotheses will use data from 1979-2019, H5 will use data
only from 2003-2019 when sufficient disclosure of the option-pricing model assumptions
began, due to the rules of Fama-French, the sample will start in 2005. Up until 1995,
investors did not have a ready source of information to analyze the company’s
assumptions on its stock option value, which makes it unlikely the market implicitly
adjusted for this option.
This study has chosen to use the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model
(Merton, 1973) to correspond with the method used by most S&P 500 firms. Rather than
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attempt to create the assumptions of volatility, dividend yields, and risk-free rates, it
seems prudent to use the same figures the firms do when expensing their stock options.
These assumptions are also the likely figures firms would choose when attempting to
create a fair value for re-issuing Treasury Stock in an audit to achieve internal
consistency. According to Finnerty (2014), 80% of S&P 500 companies use BlackScholes-Merton to calculate their stock option expenses, substituting in the life of the
grant for the length of the contract.
Stock option expense notes to the financial statements’ information are available
for most of the inputs required for the Black-Scholes-Merton model (namely the assumed
risk-free rate, stock price volatility, and dividend yield). This source of data leaves three
more inputs to use the formula: the underlying price, the strike price, and the length of the
option.
The underlying price is assumed to be the weighted-average share price of the
treasury stock. This figure is readily available on the balance sheet. It is also theoretically
sound since treasury shares are fungible.
There are two main alternatives for an assumed strike price. The first is to choose
the year-end stock price, which would suggest the market value is equal to the issuance
value of the treasury stock. It is simple and would put the option “at the money.” The
second alternative the average discount of a seasoned share offering when issuing large
quantities of treasury stock. Mola and Loughran (2004) used 3%. Altınkılıç and Hansen
(2003) calculated a similar discount estimate of 3.2%. Thus, discounting the year-end
stock price for each company by 3% would also be theoretically defensible. This study
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uses both but the “at the money” and 3% discount options but does not expect the
adjustment to change the results materially.
Technically, the time a company can exercise this put option is infinite. However,
to calculate a proxy for the typical life of this option, this study investigated the
frequency of share issuance in the S&P 500. Increases in shares outstanding would
indicate that a firm issued shares that fiscal year. Data shown in Figure 1 suggests that on
average 47% of S&P 500 companies from 1995-2019 were net issuers of shares. With a
small bit of rounding, this data would suggest an approximate 2-year life for the put
option. Note, the percentage of net issuers is declining as time goes on, with an average
of only 36% from 2011 to 2019. Since this is a significant assumption in this hypothesis,
a sensitivity analysis will be conducted to show the robustness of this assumption.
Figure 2: Percent of Companies with Weighted Average Share Count
Increases

Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

% of S&P 500
% of S&P 500
Companies with
Companies with
Increasing Share Count Year Increasing Share Count
61%
2008
40%
55%
2009
66%
54%
2010
54%
51%
2011
36%
52%
2012
45%
51%
2013
38%
67%
2014
33%
62%
2015
30%
66%
2016
37%
58%
2017
37%
46%
2018
31%
39%
2019
36%
32%
Source: Bloomberg, 2020b
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While companies that retire shares are shown statistically to issue new shares at a
slightly higher frequency as those who hold them in treasury (Banyi & Caplan, 2016),
other research shows that treasury shares are considered closer to cash than newly issued
shares in acquisitions (Jenkins & Ovtchinnikov, 2010). This finding suggests the two
forms of issues are not economically equivalent. Since retired shares require the company
to create new shares to re-issue, this study will assume that retired shares do not create
the same option value as treasury shares.
Treasury Stock Put Option
Treasury Stock

XXXX
XXXX

For McDonald’s, the company stated its expected dividend yield was 2.7%, its
expected stock price volatility was 18.9%, and its expected risk-free rate was 2.5%. As a
default, primarily to force the companies to re-assess the option value frequently, a one
year expected life was assumed. Finally, the exercise price was set to be equal to the
12/31 price used in the market value above ($197.61), and the underlying price was
determined to be the average price paid for the treasury stock ($72.55) – since that would
represent any gain the company would have had if they reissued the shares. These
assumptions generated a $140.55 value for a put option of 100 shares, valuing all treasury
stock options at $1.29 billion (the adjustment to book value). This adjustment brought
McDonald’s book-to-market value at -0.044.
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Table 3: Three Examples of Adjustments to Book Equity to Market Equity for each Hypothosis
McDonald's Mastercard
Lowe's
FY19 Book Value ($b)
$
(8.21) $
5.89 $
1.97
12/31/19 Market Capitalization ($b)
$
147.48 $ 300.68 $
94.11

H1:
No Adjustments
Book-to-Market Value

-0.056

0.020

0.021

# of Stock Options Granted
Average Strike Price of Options
LIFO Price of Repurchased Shares
Increase to Book Value Adjustment ($b)
Book-to-Market Value

14.6
$124.21
$198.28
$1.08
-0.048

6.6
$117.00
$249.58
$0.88
0.023

2.343
$86.01
$104.68
$0.04
0.021

H3:
Total Internally Generated Goodwill
Total # of Repurchased Shares
# of Shares Issued
% of Issued Shares Repurchased
Increase to Book Value Adjustement ($b)
Book-to-Market Value

$155.69
914.3
1660.6
55%
$85.72
0.526

$294.79
395
1402
28%
$83.05
0.296

$92.14
592
1403
42%
$38.88
0.434

H2:

Summary of Book-to-Market
MCD
MA
LOW
H1 -0.056
0.020
0.021
H2 -0.048
0.023
0.021
H3
0.526
0.296
0.434
H4
0.394
0.127
0.295
H5 -0.047
0.022
0.021
H4:
McDonald's Mastercard
Lowes
Weighted Avg. Price Paid, 8 years
$43.64
Total # of Treasury Shares
914.3
395
592
Book Value of Repurchased Shares ($b)
$66.33 $ 32.21 $ 25.83
Increase to Book Value Adjustement ($b)
$66.33 $ 32.21 $ 25.83
Book-to-Market Value
0.394
0.127
0.295
H5:
Expected Dividend Yield
Expected Stock Price Volatility
Risk-Free Interest Rate
Expected Life
Exercise Price (6/30 Price)
Stock Price (Avg. Price of Treasury Shares)
Black-Scholes Value per Option
Increase to Book Value Adjustement ($b)
Book-to-Market Value

2.70%
0.60%
18.90%
19.60%
2.50%
2.60%
1 year
1 year
$197.61
$269.99
$72.55 $ 81.53
$140.55
$190.55
$1.29
$0.75
-0.047
0.022

0.021
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Fama-French 3-Factor Model
To determine which method of accounting for share buybacks the market appears
to use, this study will apply the methodology used by Fama and French (1992, 1993, and
1995) in testing the 3-Factor Model. This method classified NYSE, Nasdaq and AmEx
listed stocks into six sub-portfolios to determine if different sized or type firms use share
repurchases differently. Models based on Fama and French’s 30 industry break down
(French, 2021) was also run to determine if different industries use share repurchases
differently.
Fama and French (1993) presented the following regression that can explain
between 80% and 95% of stock price movements.

The HML variable will vary as a result of the share repurchase adjustments to book value
previously discussed. First, using June 30 of year t for each year from 1979-2019, sample
set stocks will be ranked by market capitalization. The median value will be used to
separate the high market cap stocks (Big) vs. the lower market cap stocks (Small). The
breakpoint between small and big will be the median market cap of NYSE listed stocks.
Since the NYSE is dominated by large-cap stocks, the “small” market cap portfolios will
be significantly larger than the “big” portfolios. Second, the sample set of stocks will be
broken into three groups based on the book-to-market values calculated for each
company (this will be repeated multiple time for the various hypotheses). Following
Fama and French’s (1993) acknowledged arbitrary group rankings, the low group will
have the bottom 30% of BE/ME companies, the middle group will have the next 40% of
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stocks, and the high group will have the top BE/ME companies. Note, since the primary
focus of the study is share repurchases, which can drive total common shareholders’
equity below zero, negative book value companies may be added back to the sample set
due to the adjustments made, since Fama and French excluded negative book value
companies in their methodology. Book value is defined as the book value of
shareholders’ equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of F.Y.
t-1. The market capitalization used for this metric will be December 31 of t-1, consistent
with Fama & French’s methodology. The lag in the accounting-based figures is to allow
the model to predict the return. Finally, using the two groups of SMB and three groups of
HML, six initial portfolios (Small/Low, Small/Medium, Small/High, Big/Low,
Big/Medium, Big/High) will be generated.
The value-weighted, monthly returns of the six portfolios, from July 1 of year t to
June 30, t+1 will be run through the Fama-French 3-Factor Model. SMB will be
calculated as the difference, each month, between the simple average of the valueweighted monthly average returns of the small portfolios (Small/Low, Small/Medium,
Small/High) minus the big portfolios (Big/Low, Big/Medium, Big/High). HML is defined
as the difference between the monthly average value-weighted returns of the high
portfolios (Small/High, Big/High) and the low portfolios (Small/Low, Big/Low); the
middle 40% is excluded in calculating this input. Note, while SMB and HML both use
market capitalization as a part of their metric, the correlation between the two measures
have historically been negligible (Fama & French, 1993), reducing the chance of multicollinearity. Value-weighted returns of all stocks in the sample set is the proxy for the
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market return. The one-month T-bill rate is the proxy for the risk-free rate metric to be
consistent with industry standards and Fama and French’s methodology.
With six portfolios and five methods to value book-value, the overall and
incremental R2s of the HML variable was be compared to try and determine which book
value treatment yields the greatest explanation of the stock price movements of the
portfolios.
One additional set of secondary data was also evaluated. To determine if different
industries may use share repurchases differently, 30 industry portfolios from French’s
website (2021) was analyzed using the Fama-French 3 Factor model.

Market View of Share Repurchases

59

Chapter 4: Results
The first hypothesis (H1) evaluates the status quo. As such, the Fama-French 3factor model is replicated using the data from 1994-2019. This replication sets a
benchmark upon which the upcoming adjusted equity measures will be compared.
Using data from Compustat and CRSP, the model was replicated with insignificant
differences from Fama and French (1993). Table 4 presents the correlations. Observed
correlations between the replicated model and data from French’s website (French, 2021)
is 97.8% on the “Small Minus Big” (SMB) factor and 94.5% on the “High Minus Low”
(HML) factor for the 40-year period. The correlation has generally increased over time.
For example, SMB’s correlations are 99.1% and HML’s 96.6% for the most recent five
years (2014-2019). The main difference between French’s (2021) method and the
replication is the use of CUSIPs as a matching devise in the replication study, which
reduces the number of observations compared to French’s use of the CRSP/Compustat
Merge tables available on WRDS. Over time, the difference between the number of
observations in the two methodologies narrow, which likely accounts for the
improvement in the correlation coefficient.
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Table 4: Correlations of Betas of Factors in replication of Fama-French 3-Factor Model
vs published factors from French's (2021) data website
r jt - r ft = αj + β j1 (r mt -r ft ) + β j2 (SMB t ) + β j3(HMLt) + εjt
Avg.
N/yr
French

Correlation Correlation
Avg. N/yr
Replication
of βj2
of βj3
1994-2019
0.983
0.945
4,753
3,204
1994-1999
0.978
0.942
6,603
3,799
1999-2004
0.983
0.943
5,484
3,559
2004-2009
0.976
0.961
4,421
3,091
2009-2014
0.988
0.980
3,685
2,757
2014-2019
0.991
0.966
3,572
2,812
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the
first day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks
with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market
capitalization on June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small
stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30%
of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book equity to
market equity). Book equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity
minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market
equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
Next, the identical six size portfolios used in the original study were replicated.
The firms are categorized based on size (big or small) and based on their book-to-market
ratios (high, medium, and low). Hence, six portfolios result - Big/High, Big/Medium,
Big/Low, Small/High, Small/Medium, and Small/Low. Recall that the high book-tomarket firms are “value” firms (i.e., low market to book ratio) and the low book-tomarket firms are “growth” firms (i.e., high market to book firms). The six portfolios are
re-formed each year (July t-1 to June t). For the size distinctions (i.e., small/big), the
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market value of equity at June t is used to rank the firms, with all ranked largest to
smallest. The median size value of the NYSE is used as the break point. Due to size
differences between NYSE-, Amex- and NASDAQ-listed stocks, with the latter two
having a greater number of small-cap and micro-cap stocks, a majority of firms end up in
the small portfolios (an average of 2,557 firms per year are categorized as small out of an
average 3,204 total firms per year). Additionally, all firms are ranked by their book
equity to market equity. Breakpoints are created at the 30 th and 70th percentile each year
and the pool of stocks are divided accordingly. The six portfolios are then created based
on the cross section of the two metrics.
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Table 5: Results of replication regressions (H1) of monthly returns of six portfolio on excess
market returns, size and book-to-market factors from July 1994 to June 2019
r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r m t -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (HMLt ) + εjt
βj1
Small
High
0.964
Medium 0.953
Low
1.032

Big
1.017
0.984
0.948

High
Medium
Low

t(βj1 )
Small
Big
103.35 65.12
70.87
53.95
67.23
97.64

High
Medium
Low

t(βj2 )
Small
Big
63.74
0.72
43.29
-5.36
47.93 -13.43

High
Medium
Low

t(βj3 )
Small
Big
57.10
37.19
24.61
16.70
-10.07 -18.17

High
Medium
Low

s(ε)
Small
Big
0.0067 0.0111
0.0110 0.0130
0.0112 0.0069

βj2
Small
High
0.837
Medium 0.820
Low
1.037

Big
0.016
-0.138
-0.184
βj3

Small
High
0.737
Medium 0.458
Low -0.214

Big
0.804
0.422
-0.244
2

Adj. R
Small
Big
High
0.984
0.942
Medium 0.972
0.908
Low
0.970
0.974

r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first
day of the month.
r m t is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with
at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization
on June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market
capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of
book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book equity to
market equity). Book equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity minus
any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity
was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.
Monthly value-weighted returns represent July t to June t+1 .
2

R and the standard error are adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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See table 5 for results. The three Fama French factors explain a significant
portion of the variance for all six portfolios. Coefficients of determination (i.e., Rsquareds) range from a low of 0.908 for the big/medium portfolio to a high of 0.984 for
the small/high portfolio. The market beta coefficient was statistically significant in all
cases with a t-value range of 53.95 for the big/medium portfolio to a high of 103.35 for
the small/high portfolio. The market beta coefficient hovered near 1 for all portfolios.
The SMB variable was statically significant for all portfolio at the 95% level except for
the big/high portfolio. The coefficient for the SMB factor was large and positive for the
small portfolios, but small and negative for the big portfolios suggesting that the factor
does successfully capture the difference in the variation of returns by size. The HML
factor was also statistically significant for all six portfolios. The coefficient was
meaningful and positive for the high portfolios and went down incrementally, turning
negative for the low portfolios. This relationship is consistent with the suggestion that
HML captures the risk factor difference between the high book-to-market portfolios (a
proxy for value stocks) and low book-to-market portfolios (a proxy for growth stocks).
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Table 6: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor in the Replication Model (H1)
2 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt ) + εjt
S/H
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.804

2

∆R
F
p-value

0.984
0.179
3260.196
0.00

B/H
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

∆R
F
p-value

S/M
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.895

2

∆R
F
p-value

0.965
0.070
605.80
0.00

2

0.962

0.972

2

0.942
0.267
1383.061
0.00

B/M
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.822

2

∆R
F
p-value

S/L
2 Factor 3 Factor
R

0.674

2

0.908
0.086
279.057
0.00

B/L
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.945

0.974

2

∆R
0.010
∆R
0.029
F
101.36
F
330.27
p-value
0.00
p-value
0.00
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the
month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two
years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June
30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization below
the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of book
equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book equity to market equity). Book
equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of
preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors. Monthly valueweighted returns represent July t to June t+1 .
2

R is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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In Fama and French (2004), the authors argue that “HML does the heavy lifting”
in the improvement of the model over the Black-Fisher Capital Asset Pricing Model.
Table 3 confirms that HML’s addition to the model does improve its explanatory power
by a statistically significant amount for each of the six portfolios, with improvements in
R2 ranging from 0.010 for the small/low portfolio (the small cap growth portfolio) to a
high of 0.267 for the big/high portfolio (the large cap value portfolio).

Table 7: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor in the Replication Model (H1) by
Five Year Periods
2 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt ) + εjt
2

∆R
S/H
S/M
S/L
B/H
B/M
B/L
1994-1999 0.110*
0.026*
0.007*
0.203*
0.049*
0.038*
1999-2004 0.332*
0.157*
0.002*
0.412*
0.250*
0.016*
2004-2009 0.074*
0.014*
0.006*
0.120*
0.011*
0.030*
2009-2014 0.059*
0.004*
0.010*
0.082*
0.006*
0.024*
2014-2019 0.076*
0.022*
0.027*
0.129*
0.016*
0.041*
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at
the first day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ
stocks with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market
capitalization on June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and
small stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high
(top 30% of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of
book equity to market equity). Book equity was comuted by the book value of
shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end
of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML
factors. Monthly value-weighted returns represent July t to June t+1 .
* p<0.05
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As shown in Table 7, the relative contribution of the HML factor has changed
greatly during the 15-year period. During the internet bubble, the HML factor was one of
the largest components of explaining the variation in returns, especially in the high bookto-market (value) portfolios. There is no clear sustained pattern of strengthening or
weakening across time although movements up and down are found across the six
portfolios.
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H2: HML Adjusted for Prepaid Stock Option Expense Asset

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Book Values used in the Replicated Fama-French 3-Factor
Model (H1) and the Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of Repurchased Shares used
to fund Stock Options (H2)
N
Mean (BV) St. Dev (BV)
1994-2019
H1
105,857
2,026
9,691
H2
106,573
2,028
9,683
1994-1999
H1
22,858
483
2,006
H2
23,212
482
2,007
1999-2004
H1
22,490
957
3,816
H2
22,692
971
3,878
2004-2009
H1
19,683
1,937
7,785
H2
19,740
1,953
7,815
2009-2014
H1
17,825
3,046
12,243
H2
17,866
3,054
12,254
2014-2019
H1
23,001
3,892
15,433
H2
23,063
3,892
15,428

t(BV)

-0.04

0.04

-0.39

-0.20

-0.06

-0.01

Book equity (H1) was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any
reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .
Book equity (H2) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any
reported book value of preferred equity plus calculated pre-paid option expense at the end of
fiscal year t-1.
Pre-paid option expense asset is calculated as the number of unexercised but outstanding
stock options times the difference between the average price of repurchased shares - the
average exercise price.
H2 evaluates the model with treasury stock costs capitalized as an asset to fund
future share issuances to fulfill the exercise of stock options. Heightened correlations
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with share price would suggest the market appears to value share repurchases consistent
with this logic.

Treasury Stock Held for Equity Compensation
Treasury Stock

XXXX

Treasury Stock Held for Equity Compensation
Common Stock
Retained Earnings

XXXX

XXXX

OR
XXXX
XXXX

This treatment resulted in an increase in the number of observations (106,573
compared to 105,857) because formerly negative book value companies shifted to
positive because of the addition of the Treasury Stock Held for Equity Compensation
asset. This resulted in very small changes in book value with the mean for the entire
sample set increasing from $2,026 million to $2,028 million. The resulting recorded
equity adjustments did not create statistically significant changes in mean book values
according to a t-test, t (212,416) = -0.04, p=0.969.
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Book Equity-to-Market Equity ratios of the original Fama-French 3-Factor Model (H1) and the Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of Repurchased Shar
used to Fund Stock Options (H2)

N

Entire Sample
Mean St. Dev t-score

N

High
Mean St. Dev Min

Max

t-score

N

Medium
Mean St. Dev Min Max t-score

N

Low
Mean St. Dev Min Max t-sco

1994-2019
H1 105,819 3.03 72.53
H2 106,534 3.06 73.02 -0.09

39,362 7.47 118.78 0.62 17942.17
39,811 7.52 119.32 0.62 17942.17

-0.05

36,274 0.56 0.14 0.2779 1.17
36,334 0.56 0.14 0.2827 1.18

-4.16

1994-1999
H1
22,854 3.10 89.95
H2
23,207 3.22 87.17 -0.15

8,296 7.88 140.87 0.62 10719.04
8,451 8.18 144.32 0.62 10719.04

-0.14

7,639 0.53 0.11 0.3095 0.80
7,733 0.53 0.11 0.3160 0.80

-1.05

6,919 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.43
7,023 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.43 0.37

1999-2004
H1
22,484 4.76 126.83
H2
22,686 4.76 126.28 0.01

8,856 11.43 201.92 0.75 17942.17
8,957 11.37 200.79 0.75 17942.17

0.02

7,612 0.61 0.14 0.3457 0.91
7,613 0.61 0.14 0.3534 0.92

-3.37

6,016 0.21 0.11 0.00 0.46
6,116 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.47 -3.7

2004-2009
H1
19,673 2.46 25.82
H2
19,730 2.46 25.79 -0.02

6,628 6.58
6,681 6.55

0.04

7,043 0.50 0.09 0.3320 0.73
7,059 0.50 0.09 0.3359 0.73

-4.20

6,002 0.21 0.09 0.00 0.36
5,990 0.22 0.09 0.00 0.37 -3.4

2009-2014
H1
17,815 2.35 19.70
H2
17,856 2.36 19.68 -0.06

7,007
7,082

0.02

5,873 0.66
5,866 0.67

-1.19

4,935 0.26
4,908 0.27

5.22
5.21

44.20 0.63 2072.52
44.03 0.63 2072.52

31.19 0.77 1300.71
31.03 0.77 1300.71

0.17
0.17

0.39 1.17
0.39 1.18

30,183 0.21 0.10 0.00 0.54
30,389 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.54 -4.3

0.12 0.00 0.54
0.12 0.00 0.54 -1.9

2014-2019
H1
22,993 2.29 20.76
8,575 5.53 33.75 0.64 1164.59
8,107 0.50 0.13 0.28 0.87
6,311 0.18 0.08 0.00 0.34
H2
23,055 2.29 20.74 -0.01
8,640 5.51 33.63 0.65 1164.59 0.04
8,063 0.51 0.13 0.28 0.87 -1.31
6,352 0.18 0.08 0.00 0.35 -1.5
Book equity (H1) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1.
Book equity (H2) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus calculated pre-paid option expense at the end of fiscal year t-1.
Pre-paid option expense asset is calculated as the number of unexercised but outstanding stock options times the difference between the average price of repurchased shares - the average exercis
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1.
Portfolio buckets were created as high (top 30% of book equity to market equity), medium (middle 40% of book equity to market equity) and low (bottom 30% of book equity to market equity).
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A small drop in sample set size (from 106,573 book values to 106,534 book-tomarket values for H2) was the result of missing market values in the larger sample. While
there were no statistically significant changes to the mean book-to-market in the entire
sample, the addition of prepaid share repurchases to the book value resulted in some
meaningful changes to the portfolios created by the Fama-French model in the later years
of the sample. From 1999-2009, statistically significant changes are observed in the mean
values in the low and medium portfolios. From 2009-2019, changes in all portfolios were
statistically significant at the 90% threshold.
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Table 10: Correlations and Paired T-Tests of Betas of Factors in replication of FamaFrench 3-Factor Model (H1) vs. Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of
Repurchased Shares used to fund Stock Options (H2)
H1: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (HMLt ) + εjt
H2: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt ) + εjt
Correlation
of βj3
t(βj3 )
1994-2019
0.997
-0.708
1994-1999
0.996
-0.743
1999-2004
0.998
-0.826
2004-2009
0.997
0.397
2009-2014
0.997
0.300
2014-2019
0.999
-0.037
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the
first day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks
with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market
capitalization on June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and
small stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top
30% of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book
equity to market equity). Book equity was comuted by the book value of
shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of
fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high
(top 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity) and
stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option
expense to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value
of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the
number of unexercised but outstanding stock options times the difference between the
average price of repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
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The correlation between the HML Factor generated in H1 and H2 is almost
perfect. Additionally, a paired t-test shows no statistical difference in the measured
factors across all periods. The small difference is unlikely to generate a statistically
significant change in the regressions.
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Table 11: Results of regressions of monthly returns on six portfolio on excess market returns, size and bookto-market factors from July 1994 to June 2019 adjusting Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of
Repurchased Shares used to fund Stock Options (H2)
r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt ) + εjt
βj1
High
Mid
Low

Small
0.97
0.95
1.04

Big
1.02
0.99
0.95

High
Mid
Low

t(βj1 )
Small
Big
106.11 64.85
71.82
55.59
69.10
98.60

High
Mid
Low

t(βj2 )
Small
Big
65.06
1.26
43.60
-5.61
49.19 -13.45

High
Mid
Low

t(βj3 )
Small
Big
57.26
35.79
24.16
15.55
-11.08 -17.41

βj2
High
Mid
Low

Small
0.84
0.81
1.05

Big
0.03
-0.14
-0.18
βj3

High
Mid
Low

Small
0.74
0.45
-0.24

Big
0.79
0.39
-0.24

High
Mid
Low

Adj. R
Small
Big
0.984
0.942
0.966
0.913
0.973
0.974

2

s(ε)
High
Mid
Low

Small
0.0065
0.0094
0.0108

Big
0.0113
0.0127
0.0069

r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two years
of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 30, t
greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization below the median of
the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted
book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted
book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the
book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the number of
unexercised but outstanding stock options times the difference between the average price of repurchased at
the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors. Monthly valueweighted returns represent July t to June t+1 .
2

R and the standard error are adjusted for degrees of freedom.

Market View of Share Repurchases

74

Table 11 presents the multiple regression results of the Fama-French 3 Factor
Model adjusted for the pre-paid stock option asset treatment of repurchased shares and
six portfolios. The three factors continue to explain a significant portion of the variance
of all six portfolios (ranging from a low of 0.913 for the big/medium portfolio to a high
of 0.984 for the small/high portfolio). The market beta coefficient was statistically
significant in all cases with a t-value range of 55.59 for the big/medium portfolio to a
high of 106.11 for the small/high portfolio. The market beta coefficient value hovered
near 1 for all portfolios. The SMB variable was statically significant for all portfolio at
the 95% level except for the big/high portfolio (a proxy for large cap growth stocks). The
coefficient for the SMB factor was large and positive for the small portfolios, but small
and negative for the big portfolios suggesting that the factor does successfully capture the
difference in the variation of returns by size. Finally, the HML factor was statically
significant for all six portfolios. The coefficient was significant and positive for the high
portfolios and went down incrementally, turning negative for the low portfolios. This
relationship is consistent with the argument that HML captures the risk factor difference
between the high book-to-market portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios. These
results mirror the results of H1.
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Table 12: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of
Repurchased Shares used to fund Stock Options (H2)
2 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt ) + εjt
S/H
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.812

2

∆R
F
p-value

0.984
0.171
3278.372
0

B/H
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

∆R
F
p-value

S/M
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.899

2

∆R
F
p-value

0.066
583.716
0

2 Factor
2

R

0.966

0.962

2

0.941
0.251
1281.052
0

B/M
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.842

2

∆R
F
p-value

S/L
3 Factor
0.973

0.689

2

0.071
241.834
0

2 Factor
2

R

2

0.913

0.948

B/L
3 Factor
0.974

∆R
0.011
∆R
0.026
F
122.815
F
303.176
p-value
0
p-value
0
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of
the month.
r m t is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least
two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on
June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization
below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of
adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity) and stocks ranked low
(bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity). Adjusted
book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book
value of preferred equity plus the number of unexercised but outstanding stock options times the
difference between the average price of repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity
was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors. Monthly
value-weighted returns represent July t to June t+1 .
2

R is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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The overall R2 for the six portfolios, when compared to the original Fama-French
model, are either higher or the same. However, the change in each case is near zero –
with the largest change appearing in the big/high portfolio – with a difference in ∆R 2
0.016 between H1 and H2. While the overall R 2 did increase, the marginal improvement
in the model is not from the adjusted HML factor. The incremental improvement from
the smaller 2-factor (market beta and SMB) and the 3-factor model (market beta, SMB,
and HML) declined or remained equal in all cases. In other words, the small
improvement in overall explanatory power is a result of higher ∆R 2 in the SMB factor,
likely due to the increase in the number of observations (healthy stocks with negative
book values are concentrated in the “big” portfolios, which has significantly few
observations). For example, for the big/medium portfolio, the overall R 2 improved 0.005,
but the HML factor for H1 produced an incremental R 2 of 0.086, while the improvement
in H2 is only 0.071.
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Table 13: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor Book Value adjusted for the
Capitalization of Repurchased Shares used to fund Stock Options (H2) by Five Year
Periods
2 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt ) + εjt
2

∆R
S/H
S/M
S/L
B/H
B/M
B/L
1994-1999 0.100*
0.022*
0.012*
0.149*
0.035*
0.034*
1999-2004 0.322*
0.151*
0.003*
0.423*
0.211*
0.014*
2004-2009 0.069*
0.013*
0.006*
0.119*
0.007*
0.025*
2009-2014 0.056*
0.004*
0.009*
0.080*
0.006*
0.025*
2014-2019 0.076*
0.021*
0.027*
0.129*
0.014*
0.039*
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the
first day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks
with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market
capitalization on June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small
stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high
(top 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity) and
stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense
to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of
shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the
number of unexercised but outstanding stock options times the difference between the
average price of repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.
Monthly value-weighted returns represent July t to June t+1 .
* p<0.05
The relative contribution of the HML factor adjusted for the prepaid stock option
asset over 5-year increments continues to show the fluctuation in relative importance.
The HML factor was clearly a large portion of explanatory power around the internet
bubble burst of 2000. While the incremental improvement of the HML factor is weakest
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in the small/low portfolio – a proxy for small cap growth stocks -- (with a total ∆R 2 of
0.011 over the 25 year period), it is the most sustained incremental improvement over the
original Fama-French HML Factor – increasing ∆R2 in two out of five 5-year period and
only reducing it once (from 0.010 in 2009-2014 for H1 to 0.009 for H2). As the widely
accepted Fama-French 3 Factor Model is the default baseline, the lack of sustained
explanatory power for our prepaid stock option asset suggests that our adjustment does
not improve the original model. The ∆R2 for H1’s replicated original Fama-French 3Factor Model (M=0.0784, SD= 0.1014) suggest that is statistically better than H2’s 3Factor Model adjusted for prepaid stock option asset (M= 0.0734, SD= .0981), t (29) =
2.26, p=0.0315. Thus, H2 is rejected.
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H3: HML Adjusted for Capitalization of Internally Generated Goodwill

Table 14: Descriptive Statistics of Book Values used in the replication of the Fama-French 3Factor Model (H1) and the Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of Internally Generated
Goodwill (H3)

N
1994-2019
H1
105,857
H3
106,814

Entire Sample
Mean
St. Dev

T-Score

2,026
2,329

9,691
11,430

-6.60

1994-1999
H1
H3

22,858
23,208

483
480

2,006
2,001

0.15

1999-2004
H1
H3

22,490
22,727

957
1,056

3,816
4,438

-2.54

2004-2009
H1
H3

19,683
19,777

1,937
2,174

7,785
9,123

-2.78

2009-2014
H1
H3

17,825
17,914

3,046
3,405

12,243
14,106

-2.57

2014-2019
H1
H3

23,001
23,188

3,892
4,730

15,433
18,496

-5.29

Book equity (H1) was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported
book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .
Book equity (H3) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported
book value of preferred equity plus internally generated goodwill at the end of fiscal year t-1.
Internally generated goodwill is calculated as the percentage of repurchased shares to shares
issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years for retirement
accounting) multiplied by the difference of market value at December 31 t-1 and book value in FY
t-1.
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H3 adjusts the Fama-French 3-Factor Model for the percent of internally
generated goodwill (market equity – book equity on Dec. 31, t-1) asset recognized by
comparing the percent of shares repurchased to total shares issued.

Internally Generated Goodwill
Treasury Stock

XXXX

Internally Generated Goodwill
Common Stock
Retained Earnings

XXXX

XXXX

OR
XXXX
XXXX

This treatment resulted in an additional 957 observations (106,814 compared to
105,857) due to formerly negative book value companies turning positive with the
addition of the internally generated goodwill asset. The resulting mean of the sample set
increased from $2.0 billion to $2.3 billion, a statistically significant increase, t (207,700)
= -6.60, p<0.001. The change in means grew over time, with the average between 20042009 increasing a statistically significant $237 million, t (38,559)=-2.78, p<0.01, and
between 2014-2019 increasing $838 million, t(44,873)=-5.29, p<0.001.
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics of Book Equity-to-Market Equity ratios of the original Fama-French 3-Factor Model (H1) and the Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of Internally Generated Goodwill (H3)
Entire Sample
High
Medium
Low
N
Mean St. Dev t(BE/ME)
N
Mean St. Dev Min
Max
t(BE/ME)
N
Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME)
N
Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME)
1994-2019
H1 105,819 3.03 72.53
39,362 7.47 118.78 0.62 17,942.17
36,274 0.56
0.14 0.28 1.17
30,183 0.21
0.10 0.00 0.54
H3 106,805 3.09 74.22
-0.20
38,607 7.79 123.31 0.62 18,486.01
-0.36
34,934 0.61
0.14 0.31 1.22
-53.43
33,264 0.25
0.12 0.00 0.63
-41.87
1994-1999
H1
H3

22,854
23,208

3.10
3.22

89.95
87.16

-0.15

8,296
8,466

7.88 140.87 0.62 10,719.04
8.16 144.18 0.62 10,719.04

-0.13

7,639
7,715

0.53
0.53

0.11 0.31 0.80
0.11 0.31 0.80

-0.47

6,919
7,027

0.22
0.22

0.10 0.00 0.43
0.10 0.00 0.43

0.84

1999-2004
H1
H3

22,484
22,727

4.76 126.83
4.80 129.59

-0.03

8,856 11.43 201.92 0.75 17,942.17
8,875 11.56 207.20 0.79 18,486.01

-0.04

7,612
7,353

0.61
0.65

0.14 0.35 0.91
0.14 0.39 0.95

-20.05

6,016
6,499

0.21
0.25

0.11 0.00 0.46
0.12 0.00 0.52

-16.08

2004-2009
H1
H3

19,673
19,777

2.46
2.51

25.82
26.04

-0.21

6,628
6,289

6.58
7.03

44.20 0.63
45.85 0.69

2,072.52
2,091.12

-0.57

7,043
6,596

0.50
0.56

0.09 0.33 0.73
0.09 0.41 0.80

-43.01

6,002
6,892

0.21
0.26

0.09 0.00 0.36
0.11 0.00 0.44

-25.81

2009-2014
H1
H3

17,815
17,923

2.35
2.41

19.70
19.83

-0.30

7,007
6,972

5.22
5.31

31.19 0.77
31.31 0.82

1,300.71
1,300.71

-0.16

5,873
5,387

0.66
0.74

0.17 0.39 1.17
0.16 0.47 1.22

-25.75

4,935
5,555

0.26
0.32

0.12 0.00 0.54
0.14 0.00 0.63

-23.55

2014-2019
H1 22,993 2.29 20.76
8,575 5.53 33.75 0.64 1,164.59
8,107 0.50
0.13 0.28 0.87
6,311 0.18
0.08 0.00 0.34
H3 23,170 2.33 20.60
-0.19
8,005 5.96 34.97 0.74 1,164.59
-0.81
7,883 0.61
0.13 0.38 0.98
-50.69
7,291 0.23
0.11 0.00 0.47
-32.83
Book equity (H1) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1.
Book equity (H3) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus internally generated goodwill at the end of fiscal year t-1.
Internally generated goodwill is calculated as the percentage of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years for retirement accounting) multiplied by the
difference of market value at December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t-1.
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1.
Portfolio buckets were created as high (top 30% of book equity to market equity), medium (middle 40% of book equity to market equity) and low (bottom 30% of book equity to market equity).
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Per the t-scores in Table 15, there are no statically significant changes between
the mean book-to-market values of the entire sample between H1 and H3. However,
changes to the low portfolios, t (63,126 )= -41.871, p<0.001, and medium portfolios t
(71,085)=-53.4255, p<0.001) did result in statically significant changes in the mean
book-to-market values. Also, other than the high portfolios in 1999-2009, all portfolios
had statically significant changes in mean book-to-market values after 1999.
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Table 16: Correlations and Paired T-Tests of Betas of Factors in replication of Fama-French 3Factor Model (H1) vs. Book Value adjusted for the Capitalization of Internally Generated
Goodwill (H3)
H1: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (HMLt ) + εjt
H3: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt ) + εjt
Correlation
of βj3
t(βj3 )
1994-2019
0.986
0.171
1994-1999
0.999
0.918
1999-2004
0.997
1.333
2004-2009
0.949
-0.918
2009-2014
0.965
0.158
2014-2019
0.978
0.453
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day
of the month.
r m t is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at
least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on
June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market
capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of
book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book equity to market
equity). Book equity was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any
reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30%
of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to market equity)
and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally
generated goodwill to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value
of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the percentage
of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over
the past 8 years for retirement accounting) multiplied by the difference of market value at
December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t-1.end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .

The correlation between the HML Factor generated in H1 and H3 is very high,
ranging from 0.949 in 2004-2009 to 0.999 in 1994-1999. The fluctuation in the
correlation could be the result of the increased volume of share repurchases and the
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increased amount of internally generated goodwill over time. A paired T-test shows no
statistically significant changes in the results by 5-year period.

84

Market View of Share Repurchases

85

Table 17: Results of regressions of monthly returns on six portfolio on excess market returns,
size and book-to-market factors from July 1994 to June 2019 with the Book Value adjusted
for the Capitalization of Internally Generated Goodwill (H3)
r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt ) + εjt

High
Mid
Low

βj1
Small
Big
0.979
1.011
0.970
0.944
1.013
0.976

High
High
Mid
Low

βj2
High
Mid
Low

Small
0.844
0.796
1.027

Small
0.735
0.378
-0.265

Big
67.56
52.20
91.52

t(βj2 )
Big
0.001
-0.144
-0.181

High
Mid
Low

βj3
High
Mid
Low

t(βj1 )
Small
100.58
88.12
66.41

Small
62.62
48.08
48.57

Big
0.05
-5.74
-12.26

t(βj3 )
Big
0.746
0.430
-0.255

High
Mid
Low

2

Small
53.74
22.43
-12.35

Big
35.47
16.92
-16.98

Adj. R
s(ε)
Small
Big
Small
Big
High
0.983
0.943
High
0.0068 0.0105
Mid
0.965
0.902
Mid
0.0099 0.0126
Low
0.974
0.972
Low
0.0107 0.0075
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day
of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at
least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on
June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market
capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30%
of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to market equity)
and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally
generated goodwill to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value
of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the percentage
of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over
the past 8 years for retirement accounting) multiplied by the difference of market value at
December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t-1.end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors. Monthly
value-weighted returns represent July t to June t+1 .
2

R and the standard error are adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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Table 17 presents the multiple regression results of the Fama-French 3-Factor
Model adjusted for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill and the six
resulting portfolios. The three factors continue to explain a significant portion of the
variance of all six portfolios (with an adjusted R 2 ranging from a low of 0.902 for the
big/medium portfolio to a high of 0.983 for the small/high portfolio). The market beta
coefficient was statistically significant in all cases with a range of t (299) = 52.20,
p<0.001 for the big/medium portfolio to a high of t (299) = 100.58, p<0.001 for the
small/high portfolio. The market beta co-efficient hovered near 1 for all portfolios. The
SMB variable was statically significant for all portfolios at the 95% level, except the
big/high portfolio. The coefficient for the SMB factor was large and positive for the small
portfolios, but small and negative for the big portfolios suggesting that the factor does
successfully capture the difference in the variation of returns by size. Finally, the HML
factor was statically significant for all six portfolios. The coefficient was significant and
positive for the high portfolios and went down incrementally, turning negative for the low
portfolios. This relationship remains consistent with the argument that HML captures the
risk factor difference between the high book-to-market portfolios (value stocks) and low
book-to-market portfolios (growth stocks).
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Table 18: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor with the Book Value
adjusted for the Capitalizaiton of Internally Generated Goodwill (H3)
2 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = α j + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = α j + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt) + εjt
S/H
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.813

2

∆R
F
p-value

0.983
0.169
2888.425
0

B/H
2 Factor
3 Factor
2

R

∆R
F
p-value

S/M
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.898

2

∆R
F
p-value

0.965
0.067
565.246
0

2

R

2

0.960

0.974

2

0.807

2

∆R
F
p-value

2

B/M
3 Factor
0.902
0.094
286.232
0

2 Factor
R

0.943
0.24
1257.957
0

2 Factor

S/L
2 Factor 3 Factor
R

0.702

2

0.946

B/L
3 Factor
0.972

2

∆R
0.013
∆R
0.027
F
152.579
F
288.347
p-value
0
p-value
0
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken
at the first day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ
stocks with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market
capitalization on June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm)
and small stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed
stocks).
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked
high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally
generated goodwill to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of
adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to
market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of
shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the
percentage of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for
treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years for retirement accounting)
multiplied by the difference of market value at December 31 t-1 and book value
in FY t-1.end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML
factors. Monthly value-weighted returns represent July t to June t+1 .
2

R is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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The R2 for the small/medium portfolio is the only measure unchanged from H1’s
replication of the Fama-French 3-Factor Model. However, the incremental R 2 dropped
from 0.070 for H1 to 0.067 for H3. The R 2 for small/high, big/medium and big/low
portfolios dropped less than 0.01, with incremental R 2 decreasing for the small/high and
big/low portfolios, but actually increasing for the big/medium portfolio compared to H1.
The remaining two portfolios showed improved R 2 results. The small/low portfolio saw a
small increase in R2 from 0.972 in H1 to 0.974 H3, with the incremental R 2 increasing
from 0.010 to 0.013. The big/high portfolio also saw a small increase in R 2 from 0.942 in
H1 to 0.943 in H3. However, the incremental contribution of the HML factor dropped
from 0.267 in H1 to 0.240 in H3. These results are consistent with the findings of H2, and
suggest that the added number of “big” observations improves the explanatory power of
the SMB factor in the “big” portfolios.

2

Table 19: Change in R with the addition of HML with Book Valueadjusted for the Capitalization
of Internally Generated Goodwill (H3) by 5-year period.
2 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt ) + εjt
2

∆R
S/H
S/M
S/L
B/H
B/M
B/L
1994-1999 0.106* 0.024* 0.008* 0.202* 0.036* 0.037*
1999-2004 0.347* 0.149* 0.003* 0.382* 0.288* 0.020*
2004-2009 0.054* 0.013* 0.015* 0.074* 0.020* 0.028*
2009-2014 0.056* 0.002* 0.013* 0.078* 0.003* 0.024*
2014-2019 0.047* 0.020* 0.033* 0.096* 0.012* 0.050*
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors. Monthly
* p<0.05
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The relative contribution of the HML factor adjusted for the internally generated
goodwill asset over 5-year increments continues to demonstrate the fluctuation in relative
importance. The HML factor explains a large portion of the overall variance of the high
and medium portfolios during the internet bubble years, although not as much as the
original Fama-French model (for instance from 1999-2004, H1’s ∆R 2 0.412 for the
big/high portfolio compared to H3’s 0.382). Incremental improvement of the HML factor
continues to be the weakest in small/low portfolio but is also the most sustained
incremental improvement over the original Fama-French HML Factor – increasing ∆R 2 in
every 5-year periods. While marginal improvement is found in certain portfolios, the ∆R 2
for H3 (M= 0.075, SD= .100), is not statistically different from the replicated FamaFrench 3-Factor model (M=0.078, SD= 0.101), t (29) = 1.30, p=0.201. Since there is not
a statistically significant improvement over the baseline model, H3 is not supported.
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H4: HML Adjusted for Hypothesized Cash-Acquisition Asset

Table 20: Descriptive Statistics of Book Values used in the replication of the Fama-French 3Factor Model (H1) and the Book Value adjusted for the Cash Acquisition Value of Repurchased
Shares (H4)
N

Mean

1994-2019
H1
105,857
H4
107,327

St. Dev

T-Score

2,026
2,872

9,691
15,116

-15.40

1994-1999
H1
H4

22,858
23,225

483
487

2,006
2,016

-0.19

1999-2004
H1
H4

22,490
22,760

957
1,483

3,816
9,906

-7.47

2004-2009
H1
H4

19,683
19,902

1,937
3,457

7,785
16,869

-11.53

2009-2014
H1
H4

17,825
18,053

3,046
4,195

12,243
17,468

-7.22

2014-2019
H1
H4

23,001
23,387

3,892
5,073

15,433
21,386

-6.83

Book equity (H1) was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported
book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .
Book equity (H4) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported
book value of preferred equity plus value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1.
Value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 is either the book value of treasury
stock or the net share retired from t-1 to t-8 multiplied by the weighted average price of shares
over the period.

H4 record the value of net repurchased shares as an asset rather than as contraequity. The following is the journal entries.
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Treasury Stock Asset
Treasury Stock

XXXX

Treasury Stock Asset
Common Stock
Retained Earnings

XXXX

XXXX

OR
XXXX
XXXX

The adjustment to book value for the cash value of repurchased shares had the
largest impact of any hypothesis, increasing the number of positive book value
observations to 107,327, a 1,470 increase in n. The resulting mean book value of the full
sample set increased from $2.0 billion to $2.9 billion, a statistically significant increase, t
(183,165) = -15.40, p<0.001. The average book value grew a statistically significant
$1.15 billion, t (32,369) = -7.22, p<0.001, between 2009 and 2014 and an even larger
$1.2 billion, t (42,573) = -6.83, p<0.001, between 2014 and 2019.
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Table 21: Descriptive Statistics of Book-to-Market ratios of the original Fama-French 3-Factor Model (H1) and the BV adjusted for the Cash Acquisition Value of Repurchased Shares (H4)
Entire Sample
High
Medium
Low
N
Mean St. Dev t(BE/ME)
N
Mean St. Dev Min
Max
t(BE/ME)
N
Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME)
N
Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME)
1994-2019
H1
105,819 3.03 72.53
39,362
7.47 118.78 0.62 17,942.17
36,274 0.56 0.14
0.28 1.17
30,183 0.21 0.10 0.00 0.54
H4
107,326 3.54 75.33
-1.58
41,627
8.37 120.81 0.63 18,622.20
(1.07)
36,587 0.65 0.18
0.32 1.51 -81.89
29,112 0.25 0.13 0.00 0.70 -41.03
1994-1999
H1
22,854
H4
23,225

3.10 89.95
3.23 87.13

-0.16

8,296
8,320

7.88 140.87 0.62 10,719.04
8.32 145.45 0.63 10,719.04

(0.20)

7,639
7,801

0.53
0.54

0.11
0.11

0.31 0.80
0.32 0.82

-6.56

6,919
7,104

0.22
0.22

0.10 0.00 0.43
0.10 0.00 0.43

-1.86

1999-2004
H1
22,484
H4
22,760

4.76 126.83
5.01 130.44

-0.20

8,856
8,838

11.43 201.92 0.75 17,942.17
12.13 209.14 0.78 18,622.20

(0.23)

7,612
7,939

0.61
0.68

0.14
0.17

0.35 0.91
0.36 1.12

-31.23

6,016
5,983

0.21
0.24

0.11 0.00 0.46
0.13 0.00 0.55

-13.86

2004-2009
H1
19,673
H4
19,902

2.46 25.82
3.25 29.94

-2.80

6,628
7,330

6.58
7.99

44.20 0.63
48.97 0.83

2,072.52
2,072.61

(1.79)

7,043
7,159

0.50
0.64

0.09
0.13

0.33 0.73
0.41 0.97

-76.75

6,002
5,413

0.21
0.27

0.09 0.00 0.36
0.11 0.00 0.45

-29.23

2009-2014
H1
17,815
H4
18,053

2.35 19.70
3.14 25.24

-3.33

7,007
7,733

5.22
6.51

31.19 0.77
38.30 0.95

1,300.71
1,881.27

(2.25)

5,873
5,726

0.66
0.84

0.17
0.21

0.39 1.17
0.48 1.51

-48.83

4,935
4,594

0.26
0.34

0.12 0.00 0.54
0.16 0.00 0.70

-27.03

2014-2019
H1
22,993 2.29 20.76
8,575
5.53
33.75 0.64 1,164.59
8,107 0.50 0.13
0.28 0.87
6,311 0.18 0.08 0.00 0.34
H4
23,386 2.97 26.27
-3.10
9,406
6.72
41.14 0.77
1,275.77
(2.14)
7,962 0.62 0.15
0.35 1.00 -49.69
6,018 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.43 -26.71
Book equity (H1) was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .
Book equity (H4) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1.
Value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 is either the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired from t-1 to t-8 multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the period.
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1.
Portfolio buckets were created as high (top 30% of book equity to market equity), medium (middle 40% of book equity to market equity) and low (bottom 30% of book equity to market equity).
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The significant increase in the book values of many companies resulted in
meaningfully higher average book-to-market value in all the medium portfolios and all
the low portfolios except for 1994-1999. Additionally, the high portfolios from 20092019 also saw a statistically significant increase in the mean book-to-market values. The
number of firms with a high book-to-market ratio increased significantly, while the
number of firms in the low portfolios dropped in all cases except 1994-1999.

Market View of Share Repurchases

94

Table 22: Correlations and Paired T-Tests of Betas of Factors in replication of FamaFrench 3-Factor Model (H1) vs. Book Value adjusted for the Cash Acquisition Value
of Repurchased Shares (H4)
H1: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (HMLt ) + εjt
H4: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt ) + εjt
Correlatio
n of βj3
t(βj3 )
1979-2019
0.851
1.164
1994-1999
0.997
-0.570
1999-2004
0.827
1.158
2004-2009
0.645
0.679
2009-2014
0.954
-0.628
2014-2019
0.901
0.109
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the
first day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks
with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market
capitalization on June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small
stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30%
of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book equity to
market equity). Book equity was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity
minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market
equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top
30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to
market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the
cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market equity). Adjusted book equity
was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value
of preferred equity plus the value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1
(either the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired from t-1 to t-8
multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the period) at the end of fiscal
year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .

H4 resulted in the lowest average correlation of any hypothesis with H1, at 0.851
for the 25-year period. However, the lower results are concentrated in a relatively short
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time – 2001 to 2006 when the July-June correlations were -0.21, -.027, 0.40, 0.34, -0.29,
-0.27, respectfully. Starting in July 2006, the correlations quickly rebound. The t-test
show that despite the lower correlation, the average return was not statistically different.
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Table 23: Results of regressions of monthly returns on six portfolio on excess market returns,
size and book-to-market factors from July 1994 to June 2019 adjusted for the Cash
Acqusition for Repurchased Shares (H4)
r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt ) + εjt

High
Mid
Low

βj1
Small
Big
0.963
1.049
0.918
0.993
1.086
0.925

High
Mid
Low

Small
108.35
79.08
55.91

t(βj1 )
Big
52.48
52.47
85.17

Big
52.48
52.47
85.17

Small
68.27
49.38
36.23

t(βj2 )
Big
-1.46
-7.09
-11.63

Big
-1.46
-7.09
-11.63

Small
49.27
21.15
-8.46

t(βj3 )
Big
24.92
8.61
-13.08

Big
24.92
8.61
-13.08

βj2
High
Mid
Low

Small
0.837
0.791
0.971

Big
-0.040
-0.185
-0.174

High
Mid
Low

βj3
High
Mid
Low

Small
0.705
0.395
-0.265

Big
0.802
0.263
-0.229

High
Mid
Low

2

Adj. R
s(ε)
Small
Big
Small
Big
Big
High
0.985
0.912
High
0.0071 0.0146 0.0146
Mid
0.972
0.902
Mid
0.0085 0.0138 0.0138
Low
0.953
0.964
Low
0.0142 0.0079 0.0079
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day
of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at
least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on
June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market
capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30%
of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market equity)
and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of
repurchased shares to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value
of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the value of net
shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 (either the book value of treasury stock or the
net share retired from t-1 to t-8 multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the
period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors. Monthly
value-weighted returns represent July t to June t+1 .
2

R and the standard error are adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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The Fama-French 3-Factor model adjusted for the repurchased shares cash
acquisition asset has statistical significance for all three factors across all six portfolios.
The market beta factor coefficients hovers near 1.0 but has a wider spread than the
replicated Fama-French traditional model – with a range of 0.918 to 1.086 for H4
compared to 0.948 to 1.032 for H1. All market beta coefficients were statistically
significant with a low t (299) = 52.47, p<0.001 for the big/medium portfolio to a high of t
(299) = 108.35, p<0.001 for the small/high portfolio. All SMB coefficients were also
statistically significant, with coefficients positive, averaging 0.866 for the small
portfolios and -0.133 for big portfolios, supporting the factor’s ability to distinguish
differences based on size. The HML coefficient was statistically significant in all
portfolios and with a step down in the value of the coefficients as the level of the bookto-market value decreased – arguing the factor successfully captures risk associated with
valuation of the stock. The overall R2 of the regressions shows a high level of explanatory
power, ranging from 0.902 for the big/medium portfolio to a high of 0.985 for the
small/high portfolio.
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Table 24: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor with Book Value adjusted for the Cash Acqusition Asset (H4)
2 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt ) + εjt
S/H
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.863

2

∆R

0.985
0.122

F
p-value

2427.999
0

B/H
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

∆R

2

0.929

2

∆R

0.972
0.042

F
p-value

447.317
0

2

0.941

2

0.953

620.987
0
B/M
2 Factor 3 Factor

2

R

0.878

2

0.902

∆R

0.024

F
p-value

74.217
0

S/L
2 Factor 3 Factor
R

0.912
0.183

F
p-value

S/M
2 Factor 3 Factor
R

0.729

2

B/L
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

2

0.943

0.964

∆R

0.011

∆R

0.021

F
p-value

71.607
0

F
p-value

171.08
0

r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two years of trading
data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 30, t greater than
the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed
stocks).
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity
for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted
book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market equity). Adjusted book equity was
computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the value
of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 (either the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired
from t-1 to t-8 multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 .
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors. Monthly value-weighted returns
represent July t to June t+1 .
2

R is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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The re-sorting of the portfolios based on the adjustment for an asset reflecting
amounts available for a future acquisition resulted in lower R 2 for the 3-factor model with
only the small/medium portfolio increasing more than 0.001. Similarly, lower ∆R 2 are
found for the HML factor, but the adjustment did lead to a significant increase in the R 2
for the 2-factor model (with just market beta and SMB). This is likely the result of the
significantly higher number of “big” companies recognized in the adjusted model. For the
small/high portfolio, the R2 for the 3-factor model increased from 0.984 in H1 to 0.985
for H4, but the incremental R2 from HML declined from 0.179 to 0.122. Instead, the 2Factor model R2 improved from 0.804 in H1 to 0.863 in H4. The data for the
small/medium portfolio is similar. Total R2 improved to 0.972 from 0.965, while the
incremental R2 declined from 0.070 to 0.042. The two-factor model’s R 2 grew from 0.895
in H1 to 0.929 in H4. The small/low portfolio saw a decline in R 2 for both the two and
three factor models, but the ∆R2 increased from 0.010 in H1 to 0.011 in H4. The big/high
and big/medium portfolio trends were similar, with an improvement in the 2-factor
model, but slightly lower overall R 2 resulting in a lower ∆R2 for the HML factor. Finally,
the big/low portfolio saw declines in all metrics.
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2

Table 25: Change in R with the addition of HML Book Balue adjusted for the Cash Acqusition Asset
(H4) by 5-year period.
2 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r m t -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt ) + εjt
2

∆R
1994-1999
1999-2004
2004-2009
2009-2014
2014-2019

S/H
0.104*
0.255*
0.019*
0.036*
0.039*

S/M
0.023*
0.105*
0.003*
0.003*
0.016*

S/L
0.008*
0.001*
0.009*
0.008*
0.031*

B/H
0.193*
0.303*
0.023*
0.073*
0.068*

B/M
0.037*
0.032*
0.004*
0.001
0.004*

B/L
0.035*
0.019*
0.013*
0.022*
0.028*

r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the
month.
r m t is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two
years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June
30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization below
the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of
adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market equity) and stocks
ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares
to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity
minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the value of net shares repurchased at the end
of fiscial year t-1 (either the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired from t-1 to t-8
multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 .
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors. Monthly valueweighted returns represent July t to June t+1 .
* p<0.05

The relative contribution of the HML factor with book value adjusted for the cash
acquisition of repurchased shares asset over 5-year increments continues shows different
time periods of importance and strength between the portfolios. Incremental R 2 is lowest
in the low book-to-market portfolios and grows as the book-to-market value increases.
The adjusted HML factor does not explain as much of the overall variance of the high
book-to-market and medium book-to-market portfolios during the internet bubble years
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as the replicated Fama-French model (for instance from 1999-2004, H1’s ∆R 2 0.412 for
the big/high portfolio compared to H4’s 0.303. Overall, the ∆R 2 for H4 (M=0.051, SD=
.074) is statistically worse than H1 (M=0.078, SD=0.101), t (29) = 3.26, p=0.0029. It
lowers the overall explanatory power of the entire model and the incremental explanatory
factor of HML in H4 relative to the baseline replicated original Fama-French 3-Factor
model. Thus, H4 is not supported.
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H5: HML Adjusted for Put Option Value of Share Repurchases

Table 26: Descriptive Statistics of Book Values used in the replication of the Fama-French 3Factor Model (H1) and the Book Value adjusted for the Put Option Value of Treasury Shares
(H5)

N
2005-2019
H1
56,454
H5
56,500
2005-2009
H1
15,685
H5
15,690
2009-2014
H1
17,805
H5
17,815
2014-2019
H1
22,964
H5
22,994

Entire Sample
Mean St. Dev T-Score
3,110
3,133

12,794
12,839

-0.30

2,045
2,049

8,239
8,247

-0.02

3,040
3,064

12,243
12,312

-0.19

3,892
3,925

15,442
15,484

-0.23

Book equity (H1) was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported
book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .
Book equity (H5) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported
book value of preferred equity plus the Black and Scholes model value of the put option to resell Treasury Shares at the end of fiscal year t-1.

By capitalizing the put option value of re-issuing treasury stock and adding it to
book value, the mean book value of H5 increased by $22 million to $3,133 million,
increasing the number of positive book value observations to 56,500, an increase in n of
46. Here is the journal entry to show the manipulation:

Treasury Stock Put Option
Treasury Stock

XXXX
XXXX

The sample time for H5 is much shorter at only 14 years. Information needed to
perform the Black-Scholes model to calculate the put option value was not disclosed until
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FY2003/2004 depending on the company. The 70 basis point increase in the mean of the
average book value is not statistically significant, t (112,951) = -0.30, p=0.382.
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Table 27: Descriptive Statistics of Book-to-Market ratios of the original Fama-French 3-Factor Model (H1) and the BV adjusted for the Put Option of Treasury Shares (H5)
Entire Sample
High
Medium
Low
N
Mean St. Devt(BE/ME)
N
Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME)
N
Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/ME)
N
Mean St. Dev Min Max t(BE/M
2005-2019
H1 56,454 2.28 21.66
20,865 5.49 35.40 0.63 2072.52
19,623 0.55 0.15 0.03 1.17
15,996 0.213 0.103 0.000 0.535
H5 56,499 2.29 21.71
-0.03 20,914 5.49 35.46 0.63 18622.20 -0.003 19,477 0.55 0.15 0.28 1.17
-2.56
16,108 0.216 0.104 0.000 0.536
2.23
2005-2009
H1 15,685
H5 19,353

2.20 24.82
2.32 24.71

-0.01

5,323
5,334

5.76 42.39 0.63 2072.52
5.76 42.62 0.63 2093.61

-0.003

5,644
6,843

0.49
0.49

0.10 0.03 0.73
0.17 0.33 1.17

-1.59

4,768 0.211 0.087 0.000 0.351
5,334 0.230 0.107 0.000 0.536

4.89

2009-2014
H1 17,805
H5 17,815

2.35 19.70
2.35 19.71

-0.02

7,003
7,012

5.23 31.20 0.77 1300.71
5.23 31.19 0.77 1300.71

-0.096

5,888
5,854

0.66
0.67

0.17 0.39 1.17
0.17 0.39 1.17

-1.19

4,919 0.261 0.120 0.000 0.535
4,949 0.265 0.120 0.000 0.536

-1.68

2014-2019
H1 22,964
H5 22,993

2.29 20.77
2.29 20.78

-0.02

8,559
8,568

5.54 33.78 0.64 1164.59
5.54 33.79 0.65 1164.59

-0.011

8,096
8,042

0.51
0.51

0.13 0.28 0.87
0.13 0.28 0.87

-2.30

6,310 0.177 0.084 0.000 0.622
6,384 0.181 0.085 0.000 0.435

-3.15

Book equity (H1) was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .
Book equity (H5) was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the Black Scholes model value of the put option to re-sell
Treasury Shares at the end of fiscal year t-1.
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1.
Portfolio buckets were created as high (top 30% of book equity to market equity), medium (middle 40% of book equity to market equity) and low (bottom 30% of book equity to market
equity).
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Small differences seen in the mean book-to-market ratios are nonetheless
statistically significant for the full sample set in the medium and low portfolios, but not
necessarily in each five-year increment. Overall, the adjustment of adding the put value
of treasury shares did not move the book value mean of the entire sample in a statistically
significant way t (112,951) = -0.03, p=0.975 or move the mean of any high portfolio.
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Table 28: Correlations and Paired T-Tests of Betas of Factors in replication of FamaFrench 3-Factor Model (H1) vs. Book Value adjusted for the Put Option value of
Treasury Stock (H5)
H1: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt ) + εjt
H5: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt ) + εjt
Correlation
of βj3
t(βj3)
2005-2019
1.000
-1.14
2005-2009
1.000
-0.43
2009-2014
1.000
-0.03
2014-2019
0.999
-1.28
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the
first day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks
with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market
capitalization on June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small
stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30%
of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book equity to
market equity). Book equity was computed by the book value of shareholder's equity
minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market
equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top
30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market equity)
and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of
treasury shares to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book
value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the
Black Scholes model value of the put option to re-sell Treasury Shares at market value at
the end of fiscal year t-1. Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .

The relatively small size of the put option asset and small number of new
observations makes this adjustment almost meaningless. The correlation between the
HML factors for H1 and H5 is nearly perfectly positive. The t-score reveals no statistical
difference between the factors of H1 and H5.
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Table 29: Results of regressions of monthly returns on six portfolio on excess market
returns, size factor and book-to-market factors from July 2005 to June 2019 adjusted for
the Put Option Asset of Treasury Shares (H5)
r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt ) + εjt
βj1

t(βj1 )

High
Mid
Low

Small
0.954
0.983
1.056

Big
1.054
0.985
0.952

High
Mid
Low

βj2
Small
0.890
0.888
0.970

Big
-0.025
-0.122
-0.105

High
Mid
Low

Small
93.58
71.76
56.70

Big
51.75
60.95
85.41

High
Mid
Low

t(βj2 )
Small
47.14
34.99
28.13

Big
-0.66
-4.07
-5.09

βj3

t(βj3 )

High
Mid
Low

Small
0.656
0.252
-0.289

Big
0.753
0.167
-0.301

High
Mid
Low

Adj. R
Small
Big
0.992
0.961
0.984
0.963
0.972
0.979

High
Mid
Low

2

Small
37.42
10.71
-9.03

Big
21.50
6.01
-15.71

s(ε)
High
Mid
Low

Small
0.005
0.007
0.009

Big
0.010
0.008
0.006

r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first
day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with
at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization
on June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market
capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top
30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market equity)
and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of
treasury shares to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value
of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the Black
Scholes model value of the put option to re-sell Treasury Shares at market value at the end
of fiscal year t-1. Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors.
Monthly value-weighted returns represent July t to June t+1 .
2
R and the standard error are adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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Table 29 shows the results of the multiple regression performed with the adjusted
factors for the put option asset value related to treasury stock. The results are as expected
and due to the time change (2005-2019 for H5 compared to 1994-2019 for the similar
tables for the other four hypotheses), show the Fama-French 3-Factor model has a higher
adjusted R2 in recent times. The three factors together explained a significant portion of
the variance of all six portfolios (ranging from a low of 0.961 for the big/high portfolio to
a high of 0.992 for the small/high portfolio). The market beta coefficient was statistically
significant in all cases with a range t (164) = 51.75, p<0.001 for the big/high portfolio to
a high of t (164) =93.58, p<0.001 for the small/high portfolio. The market beta
coefficient hovered near 1 for all portfolios. The SMB variable was statically significant
for all portfolio at the 95% level except for the big/high portfolio. The coefficient for the
SMB factor was large and positive for the small portfolios, but small and negative for the
big portfolios suggesting that the factor does successfully capture the difference in the
variation of returns by size. Finally, the HML factor was statically significant for all six
portfolios. The coefficient was meaningful and positive for the high book-to-market
portfolios and went down incrementally, turning negative for the low book-to-market
portfolios. This relationship is consistent with the suggestion that HML captures the risk
factor difference between the high book-to-market portfolios (value stocks) and low
book-to-market portfolios (growth stocks).
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Table 30: Incremental Validity of the HML Factor with the Book Value adjusted for the Put Option
Asset of Treasury Shares (H5)
2 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt ) + εjt
S/H
B/H
2 Factor 3 Factor
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.921

2

∆R
F
p-value

0.992
0.07
1400.256
0

2

R

∆R
F
p-value

S/M
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.972

2

∆R
F
p-value

0.984
0.011
114.736
0

2

0.958

0.972

2

0.961
0.108
462.085
0

B/M
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.956

2

∆R
F
p-value

S/L
2 Factor 3 Factor
R

0.852

2

0.963
0.008
36.157
0

B/L
2 Factor 3 Factor
2

R

0.949

0.979

2

∆R
0.014
∆R
0.03
F
81.482
F
246.817
p-value
0
p-value
0
r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of
The six portfolios were created from the cross section of the SMB and HML factors. Monthly
2

R is adjusted for degrees of freedom.

Table 30 confirms that HML’s addition to the model does improve its explanatory
power by a statistically significant amount for each of the six portfolios, with ∆R 2
ranging from 0.008 for the big/medium portfolio to a high of 0.108 for the big/high
portfolio. The results are almost identical for every portfolio, with a small difference
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noted in the big/medium portfolio. For that portfolio, the 3-factor R 2 increased from
0.959 in H1 to 0.963 in H5, but the ∆R2 declined from 0.012 in H1 to 0.008 in H5.
2

Table 31: Change in R with the addition of HML with Book Value adjusted for the Put Option
Asset of Treasury Shares (H5) by 5-year period.
2 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + εjt
3 Factor Model: r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt ) + εjt
2

∆R
S/H
2005-2009 0.070*
2009-2014 0.059*
2014-2019 0.073*

S/M
0.012*
0.004*
0.021*

S/L
0.005*
0.010*
0.027*

B/H
0.113*
0.084*
0.124*

B/M
0.006*
0.005*
0.015*

B/L
0.022*
0.025*
0.040*

r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of
the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least
two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June
30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization
below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
adj. HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of
adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market equity) and stocks
ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to
market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity
minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the Black Scholes model value of the put
option to re-sell Treasury Shares at market value at the end of fiscal year t-1. Market equity was
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
* p<0.05

The relative contribution of the HML factor adjusted for the hypothesized put
option asset of treasury stock over 5-year increments shows small but meaningful
contributions throughout all six portfolios from 2005 to 2019. Incremental R 2 is lowest in
the medium book-to-market portfolios. However, the adjusted HML factor is not
statistically different from the replicated Fama-French 3-Factor Model, which is the
baseline. In a paired T-test of the ∆R2 for H5 (M=0.040, SD= .038), the results are not
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statistically different from H1 (M=0.040, SD=0.040), t (17) = -1.4, p=0.176. Thus, H5 is
not supported since it did not improve the explanatory power of the model.

H1: Replicated Fama-French 3-Factor Model
Since the replicated Fama-French model, representing the return of capital
treatment of repurchased shares either was better or statistically equivalent to all other
hypothesized treatments H1 is supported.
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Industry-Level Data
2

Table 32a: Industry Level Adjusted R for each hypthosis
H1 (Replicated Fama-French 3 Factor): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (HMLt ) + εjt
H2 (Fama French adjusted for Prepaid Stock Options): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r m t -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt2 ) + εjt
H3 (Fama French adjusted for Internally Generated Goodwill): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r m t -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt3) + εjt
H4 (Fama French adjusted for Cash Acqusition Asset): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r m t -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt4 ) + εjt
H5 (Fama French adjusted for Put Option repuchased shares): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r m t -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt5) + εjt
2

R for each regression, all p<0.001 * notes p < 0.05 for HML variable, ** for p < 0.01 for HML variable
Food1994-20192005-20192014-2019
Hshld1979-20192005-20192014-2019
Cnstr1979-20192005-20192014-2019
H1 44.6%** 57.8% 47.6%
H1 41.6%** 52.4% 43.0%
H1 74.0%** 84.0%** 82.7%
H2 44.2%** 57.9% 47.7%
H2 41.4%** 52.5% 42.9%
H2 73.9%** 84.0%** 82.7%
H3 45.8%** 58.0% 47.8%
H3 42.2%** 52.6% 42.4%
H3 74.3%** 84.1%* 82.8%
H4 39.4%** 58.0% 47.8%
H4 39.7%* 52.6% 43.6%
H4 72.7%** 84.3%* 82.6%
H5
57.8% 47.9%
H5
52.5% 42.9%
H5
84.0%** 82.7%
Beer1994-20192005-20192014-2019
H1 27.8%* 44.3% 44.8%
H2 27.4%* 44.4% 45.0%
H3 29.1%* 44.1% 45.1%
H4 24.8%* 44.8%* 45.7%
H5
44.3% 44.9%

Clothes1994-20192005-20192014-2019
H1 52.7%** 60.1% 43.0%
H2 52.5%** 60.1% 42.9%
H3 53.0%** 60.1% 42.4%
H4 53.1%** 60.0% 43.6%
H5
60.1% 42.9%

Steel1994-20192005-20192014-2019
H1 67.7%** 67.8% 59.7%**
H2 67.7%** 67.8% 59.8%**
H3 67.7%** 67.7% 58.9%**
H4 67.4%* 68.0% 57.3%*
H5
67.8% 59.5%**

Smoke1994-20192005-20192014-2019
H1 14.2%** 28.0% 23.9%
H2 14.2%** 28.1% 24.2%
H3 14.7%** 28.2% 25.3%
H4 12.1%** 28.1% 25.2%
H5
28.0% 24.1%

Health1994-20192005-20192014-2019
H1 48.1% 63.9%** 71.1%**
H2 48.0% 64.0%** 71.1%**
H3 48.4% 63.9%** 69.1%**
H4 47.7% 63.8%** 76.2%**
H5
64.0%** 71.2%**

FabPr1994-20192005-20192014-2019
H1 75.4%** 79.8% 77.5%**
H2 75.4%** 79.8% 77.5%**
H3 75.5%** 79.8% 77.8%**
H4 75.6%** 80.1% 77.1%**
H5
79.8% 77.5%**

r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two years of trading data and recorded book
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE
listed firm) and small stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
H1: HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked
low (bottom 30% of book equity to market equity). Book equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book
value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H2: adj. HML t2 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option
expense to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity). Adjusted
book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the number of
unexercised but outstanding stock options times the difference between the average price of repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity
was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H3: adj. HML t3 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of
internally generated goodwill to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally
generated goodwill to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value
of preferred equity plus the percentage of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years
for retirement accounting) multiplied by the difference of market value at December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t-1.end of fiscal year t-1 . Market
equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H4: adj. HML t4 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition
value of repurchased shares to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of
repurchased shares to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book
value of preferred equity plus the value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 (either the book value of treasury stock or the net share
retired from t-1 to t-8 multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H5: adj. HML t5 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value
of treasury shares to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to
market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity
plus the Black Scholes model value of the put option to re-sell Treasury Shares at market value at the end of fiscal year t-1. Market equity was
measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
2
R is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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Table 32b: Industry Level Adjusted R for each hypthosis
H1 (Replicated Fama-French 3 Factor): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (HMLt ) + εjt
H2 (Fama French adjusted for Prepaid Stock Options): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt2 ) + εjt
H3 (Fama French adjusted for Internally Generated Goodwill): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r m t -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt3) + εjt
H4 (Fama French adjusted for Cash Acqusition Asset): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt4 ) + εjt
H5 (Fama French adjusted for Put Option repuchased shares): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r m t -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3 (adj. HMLt5) + εjt
2

R for each regression, all p<0.001 * notes p < 0.05 for HML variable, ** for p < 0.01 for HML variable
Carry 1979-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
Telcm 1979-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 62.1%**
74.1%
64.6%
H1
64.9%
72.6%
58.0%
H2 62.0%**
74.1%
64.7%
H2
65.0%
72.5%
58.1%
H3 63.0%**
74.2%
64.7%
H3
64.8%
73.2%
59.0%
H4 60.7%**
74.0%
64.3%
H4
65.1%
72.3%
55.0%
H5
74.1%
64.7%
H5
72.6%
58.1%

Whlsl 1979-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1
70.6%**
86.1%*
82.2%
H2
70.7%**
86.1%*
82.2%
H3
71.0%**
86.0%*
82.3%
H4
69.8%**
86.0%*
82.6%
H5
86.0%*
82.1%

Mines 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 30.7%**
36.2%
28.9%*
H2 30.8%**
36.2%
29.1%*
H3 31.1%**
36.2%
28.7%*
H4
28.7%*
36.8%
25.7%
H5
36.2%
28.7%*

Servs 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 85.8%** 84.0%** 84.0%**
H2 85.7%** 86.1%** 84.1%**
H3 85.9%** 86.3%** 84.9%**
H4 81.1%** 83.5%**
82.5%*
H5
86.2%** 84.1%**

Rtail 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1
59.9%
69.0%* 74.0%**
H2
59.9%
69.2%* 74.1%**
H3
60.0%
68.7% 73.9%**
H4
60.1%
68.3% 75.8%**
H5
69.0%* 74.1%**

Coal 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 19.0%**
22.2%
12.1%
H2 19.0%**
22.2%
12.1%
H3 18.5%**
22.0%
9.9%
H4
18.1%*
22.5%
10.9%
H5
22.2%
11.8%

BusEq 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 80.4%** 82.2%** 74.7%**
H2 79.7%** 82.0%** 74.6%**
H3 80.7%** 82.5%** 76.1%**
H4 72.1%**
78.1%
69.6%
H5
82.2%** 74.7%**

Meals 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1
50.9%**
63.4%
52.3%
H2
50.7%**
63.4%
52.4%
H3
52.1%**
63.1%
52.3%
H4
51.0%**
63.1%
52.7%
H5
63.4%
52.4%

r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small stocks
(market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
H1: HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of book
equity to market equity). Book equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 .
Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H2: adj. HML t2 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity) and
stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's
equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the number of unexercised but outstanding stock options times the difference between the average price of
repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H3: adj. HML t3 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to
market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to market equity). Adjusted book equity was
computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the percentage of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury
stock for treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years for retirement accounting) multiplied by the difference of market value at December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t1.end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H4: adj. HML t4 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to
market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market equity). Adjusted book equity was
computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 (either
the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired from t-1 to t-8 multiplied by the weighted average price of shares over the period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market
equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H5: adj. HML t5 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market
equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the
book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the Black Scholes model value of the put option to re-sell Treasury Shares at market
value at the end of fiscal year t-1. Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
2
R is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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Table 32c: Industry Level Adjusted R for each hypthosis
H1 (Replicated Fama-French 3 Factor): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt) + εjt
H2 (Fama French adjusted for Prepaid Stock Options): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt2) + εjt
H3 (Fama French adjusted for Internally Generated Goodwill): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt3) + εjt
H4 (Fama French adjusted for Cash Acqusition Asset): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt4) + εjt
H5 (Fama French adjusted for Put Option repuchased shares): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt5) + εjt
2

R for each regression, all p<0.001 * notes p < 0.05 for HML variable, ** for p < 0.01 for HML variable
Games1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
Chems 1994-20192005-2019 2014-2019
ElcEq 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 64.8%**
69.8%
58.0%*
H1 68.4%** 77.3%
73.0%
H1 72.3%**
80.5%
81.6%
H2 64.7%**
69.8%
58.0%*
H2 67.9%** 77.3%
72.9%
H2 72.3%**
80.5%
81.6%
H3 64.7%**
69.8%
59.0%*
H3 68.5%** 77.3%
73.5%
H3 72.4%**
80.3%
81.9%
H4 65.1%**
69.8%
57.2%
H4 67.3%** 77.3%
72.7%
H4 72.4%**
80.6%
81.9%
H5
70.6%
58.1%*
H5
77.3%
73.0%
H5
80.5%
81.7%
Books1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 68.7%** 75.7%**
73.0%*
H2 68.4%** 75.5%**
73.1%*
H3 68.7%** 76.0%**
73.5%*
H4 66.0%**
75.0%*
72.4%
H5
75.6%**
73.0%*

Txtils 1994-20192005-2019 2014-2019
H1 57.2%** 60.6%**
72.6%
H2 56.4%** 60.3%**
72.5%
H3 56.8%** 60.4%**
73.2%
H4 55.8%** 59.9%**
72.2%
H5
60.6%**
72.6%

Autos 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 60.8%**
68.1%*
68.7%*
H2 60.7%**
68.0%*
68.7%*
H3 61.2%**
68.2%*
68.8%*
H4 61.6%**
68.1% 69.3%**
H5
68.1%*
68.6%*

Oil1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 44.3%**
49.5% 62.0%**
H2 44.0%**
49.6% 62.0%**
H3 44.9%**
50.0%* 62.0%**
H4 38.7%**
48.4% 59.6%**
H5
49.5% 62.0%**

Paper 1994-20192005-2019 2014-2019
H1 67.3%** 79.4%
75.0%
H2 66.8%** 79.4%
75.0%
H3 68.1%** 79.5%
74.9%
H4 65.8%** 79.3%
75.2%
H5
79.4%
75.0%

Fin 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 85.1%** 87.1%** 84.0%**
H2 85.0%** 87.2%** 83.8%**
H3 84.1%** 85.8%** 83.2%**
H4 81.0%** 84.7%** 82.9%**
H5
84.7%** 83.9%**

r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm)
and small stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
H1: HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low
(bottom 30% of book equity to market equity). Book equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of
preferred equity at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H2: adj. HML t2 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to
market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity). Adjusted book equity was
computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the number of unexercised but outstanding stock
options times the difference between the average price of repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H3: adj. HML t3 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally
generated goodwill to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to
market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the
percentage of repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years for retirement accounting) multiplied
by the difference of market value at December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t-1.end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H4: adj. HML t4 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of
repurchased shares to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to
market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the
value of net shares repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 (either the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired from t-1 to t-8 multiplied by the
weighted average price of shares over the period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H5: adj. HML t5 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of
treasury shares to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market equity).
Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the Black Scholes
model value of the put option to re-sell Treasury Shares at market value at the end of fiscal year t-1. Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
2
R is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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Table 32d: Industry Level Adjusted R2 for each hypthosis
H1 (Replicated Fama-French 3 Factor): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(HMLt ) + εjt
H2 (Fama French adjusted for Prepaid Stock Options): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt2) + εjt
H3 (Fama French adjusted for Internally Generated Goodwill): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt3) + εjt
H4 (Fama French adjusted for Cash Acqusition Asset): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt4) + εjt
H5 (Fama French adjusted for Put Option repuchased shares): r jt - r ft = αj + βj1 (r mt -r ft ) + βj2 (SMB t ) + βj3(adj. HMLt5) + εjt
2

R for each regression, all p<0.001 * notes p < 0.05 for HML variable, ** for p < 0.01 for HML variable
Util1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
Trans1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 31.5%**
33.4%
10.5%*
H1 66.3%**
73.5%*
71.8%
H2 30.6%**
33.4%
10.5%*
H2 66.3%**
73.2%*
71.8%
H3 31.3%**
33.5%
10.5%*
H3 67.0%**
73.4%*
72.2%
H4 27.0%**
33.5%
10.6%
H4 67.4%**
73.5%*
71.2%
H5
33.4%
10.5%*
H5
73.2%*
71.7%

Other 1994-2019 2005-2019 2014-2019
H1 60.0%** 75.8%** 76.0%**
H2 59.6%** 75.3%** 76.0%**
H3 59.8%** 75.2%** 77.4%**
H4 58.5%** 72.9%**
72.9%*
H5
75.8%** 76.1%**

r jt is the value-weighted monthly return of a designated portfolio.
r ft is the monthly risk-free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill, taken at the first day of the month.
r mt is the value-weighted monthly return of all NYSE, AmEx, and NASDAQ stocks with at least two years of trading data and recorded book value.
SMB t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of big stocks (market capitalization on June 30, t greater than the median of the NYSE listed firm) and small
stocks (market capitalization below the median of the NYSE listed stocks).
H1: HML t the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of book equity to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30%
of book equity to market equity). Book equity was comuted by the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity at the end
of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H2: adj. HML t2 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market
equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for pre-paid option expense to market equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the
book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the number of unexercised but outstanding stock options times the
difference between the average price of repurchased at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H3: adj. HML t3 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally
generated goodwill to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the capitalization of internally generated goodwill to market
equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the percentage of
repurchased shares to shares issued (in treasury stock for treasury stock reporters or over the past 8 years for retirement accounting) multiplied by the difference of
market value at December 31 t-1 and book value in FY t-1.end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H4: adj. HML t4 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of
repurchased shares to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the cash acquisition value of repurchased shares to market
equity). Adjusted book equity was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the value of net shares
repurchased at the end of fiscial year t-1 (either the book value of treasury stock or the net share retired from t-1 to t-8 multiplied by the weighted average price of
shares over the period) at the end of fiscal year t-1 . Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
H5: adj. HML t5 the difference in monthly, value-weighted returns of stocks ranked high (top 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares
to market equity) and stocks ranked low (bottom 30% of adjusted book equity for the put option value of treasury shares to market equity). Adjusted book equity
was computed as the book value of shareholder's equity minus any reported book value of preferred equity plus the Black Scholes model value of the put option to resell Treasury Shares at market value at the end of fiscal year t-1. Market equity was measured on Dec 31, t-1 .
2
R is adjusted for degrees of freedom.
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While the data for market-wide data suggests that none of the hypothesized
treatments of repurchased shares dominate, industry-data shows a slightly different story.
Using French’s data for 30 industries (French, 2021), multiple regression for the five of
the hypothesized treatments of share repurchases from 1994-2019, 2005-2019 and 20142019. For the 1994-2019 period, the HML factor was a non-statistically significant
variable in 3 of the 30 industries across all hypotheses (Beer, Telecom, and Retail). From
2005-2019, HML was not statically significant in 16 of the 30 industries across all 5
hypotheses (Food, Smoke, Games, Chemicals, Clothes, Household, Steel, Fabrication
Production, Electrical Equipment, Utilities, Coal, Mines, Carry, Telecom, Paper, and
Meals). Finally, from 2014-2019, 16 industries were not statistically significant at the 5%
level (Food, Beer, Smoke, Household, Clothes, Textiles, Chemicals, Electric Equipment,
Construction, Carry, Coal, Telecom, Paper, Transportation, Meals, and Wholesale).
For most industries, the relative change in the explanatory power of the of various
hypothesis varied minorly. However, for one industry in the most recent period, H4 (book
value adjusted for the cash asset value of repurchased shares), dominated the other
hypotheses. In the Health industry, the adjusted R 2 for the cash asset value of repurchased
shares was 76.2%, compared to a range of 69.1% to 71.2% for the remaining hypothesis.
The incremental R2 for the HML variable was .133 from .628 for the two-factor
regression (market beta and SMB) to .762 (market beta, SMB and HML). This is a
significant improvement over the Fama-French 3-Factor replication when the two-factor
model explained 62.7% of the variability of returns and the 3-Factor model explained
71.1% of the variability of returns, a change in R 2 of 0.086. As the Healthcare industry is
one of the most active in the mergers and acquisition market with more than 12,000
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acquisitions between 2014-2019 (Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances,
2021), the implication that share repurchases are treated like a cash-like asset is
meaningful.
H4 also was noticeably better for the Auto and Retail industries in the most recent
period. As the most active repurchasers of shares for both of these industries are “older
technology” (brick and mortar for retail and combustion engines for auto), this is an
interesting finding without an easy explanation.
Finally, both Books (mainly publishing companies) and the catch-all “Other”
industry show more than 1% improvement under the capitalization of internally
generated goodwill hypothesis H3 in the most recent period. Correspondingly, the asset
treatment of repurchased shares (H4) is significantly worse in these cases as well.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Two Aspects of the Study
This study is relevant to both accounting and finance. From a finance perspective,
this study explores the possibility that excessive share repurchase activity caused
measurement problems in the HML factor within the Fama-French 3-Factor Model. More
importantly, the study addresses how to correct the measurement problem. From an
accounting point of view, this study serves to inform the question of market perception of
treasury stock transactions, which should drive the accounting for the transaction. First, I
will discuss the finance implications and results. Finally, I will discuss the accounting
perspective.

The Variability of HML
The HML factor's influence on the explanatory ability of the Fama-French 3Factor Model has fluctuated dramatically over the past twenty-five years. The factor is
incrementally more critical in explaining value portfolios (high book-to-market
portfolios) with an average incremental R 2 of 0.223 from 1994-2019 than growth
portfolios (low book-to-market portfolios), which had an average incremental R 2 of .020
across the 25 years. HML's role in explaining portfolio returns fluctuated significantly,
with a low of 0.031 from 2009-2014 across the six portfolios to a high of 0.194 during
1999-2004. The dot-com bubble and its subsequent recovery resulted in vastly different
returns between growth and value companies, and the HML factor became highly
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influential in explaining the resulting returns. These results show that the HML factor is
necessary to explain the difference between value and growth companies.

HML and Share Repurchases
Unlike dividends, which come with an implicit promise to continue and can signal
maturation of the company's growth prospects, share repurchases are a more flexible
form of returning cash to shareholders. Share repurchases are widespread across both
value and growth stocks. In 2018, 53% of all companies and 89% of the S&P 500
engaged in share repurchase activity (Zeng & Luk, 2020). Additionally, based on
Standard & Poor's buyback index and its labeling style methodology, value stocks tended
to be only slightly more active in repurchasing shares – representing on average 56% of
the index between 1996 and 2020 (Zeng & Luk, 2020).
For the Fama-French method of distinguishing style (book-to-market equity),
share repurchases manipulate book value which can cause “value” companies to be
viewed by the model as “growth” companies because of the reduced book equity. High
volumes of share repurchases lower the book value. Indeed, the model becomes
irrelevant if companies repurchases shares and take recorded book value to negative. In
the S&P 500, 23 stocks have negative book value (S&P, 2021). These stocks will be
eliminated from the portfolios necessary to create the factors. The negative book value
list is dominated by value, retail-based companies with low growth prospects. They
generate significant cash and have extensive undervalued real estate holdings on their
balance sheets (companies like McDonald's, Starbucks, and Home Depot) and are not the
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"financial distressed" companies that Fama and French eliminated (Fama & French,
1993). While this hurts the "n" related to creating the factors, the companies that buy
back significant quantities of shares and maintain a "near" zero book value are mislabeled
in the Fama-French factor. This study's results did not find a consistent improvement in
the R2 in any hypothesized treatments. However, instances of improved results suggest
that the book value manipulation of share repurchases affects the HML factor's ability to
explain returns in all cases. As share repurchases continue to grow, especially considering
the near-zero cost of borrowings and the acceptance by the market of negative
shareholder's equity, the quantitative approach of proxying value and growth will likely
continue to get worse. However, this research was unable to find a silver bullet to find
consistent improvement in the metric.
Due to the 30% and 70% breakpoints in HML, many of the manipulations
changed a company's book value, but did not change their style portfolio. The "error" of
labeling value stocks as growth stocks did not dominate the changes in the style
portfolios. Since all manipulations would have only increased book value, negative book
value companies could go into any of the three portfolios (growth, neutral, or value).
Growth stocks (low book-to-market) could be moved into the neutral or value portfolios.
Neutral stocks could tip over into value. Finally, value stocks would not move portfolios
despite the adjustment.
Therefore, if the majority of the "error" was value stocks masquerading as growth
stocks, we should observe the changes in book value, thus increasing the number of high
book to market (value) stocks and reducing the number of growth (low book to market
companies). However, the dominating move was bringing more companies into the
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sample set across the spectrum of all styles. As shown in Table 33, the percentage of
stocks in each portfolio is not consistently changing, partially due to the breakpoints'
moving target.
Table 33: Percent of observations in HML style portfolios
1994-1999
H1
H2
H3
H4

High Medium
36.3% 33.4%
36.4% 33.3%
36.5% 33.2%
35.8% 33.6%

Low
30.3%
30.3%
30.3%
30.6%

1999-2004
H1
H2
H3
H4

High Medium
39.4% 33.9%
39.5% 33.6%
39.1% 32.4%
38.8% 34.9%

Low
26.8%
27.0%
28.6%
26.3%

2004-2009
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5*

High Medium
33.7% 35.8%
33.9% 35.8%
31.8% 33.4%
36.8% 36.0%
27.6% 35.4%

Low
30.5%
30.4%
34.8%
27.2%
27.6%

2009-2014
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5

High
39.3%
39.7%
38.9%
42.8%
39.4%

Medium
33.0%
32.9%
30.1%
31.7%
32.9%

Low
27.7%
27.5%
31.0%
25.4%
27.8%

2014-2019
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5

High
37.3%
37.5%
34.5%
40.2%
37.3%

Medium
35.3%
35.0%
34.0%
34.0%
35.0%

Low
27.4%
27.6%
31.5%
25.7%
27.8%

*Data from 2005-2009 when the sample set for H5 begins
Style portfolios were created as high (top 30% of book equity to market equity), medium
(middle 40% of book equity to market equity) and low (bottom 30% of book equity to
market equity).

H1: Return of Capital
The traditional accounting method suggesting that repurchased shares are a
permanent return of capital is a struggle for practitioners to accept. Despite nearly 90% of
firms in the S&P 500 having active repurchase programs in 2019, weighted average share
counts have increased every other year for the last 20 years (Bloomberg, 2020b). There
appears to be nothing permanent about the return of capital – with acquisitions being the
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primary reason for the increases, followed by stock compensation. Nevertheless, it has
some significant advantages. This form of accounting can be applied to both treasury and
retired shares with equal impact; it is reliable, objective, and verifiable; finally, there is
no use of estimates in the figures. In today's world of financial engineering, firms have
taken share buybacks to the extreme, returning capital that was never recorded (resulting
in negative book value). The billions of dollars used in this form of shareholder returns
have attracted political attention. For example, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie
Sanders have advocated banning or significantly curtailing the activity.
Surprisingly, despite the practical problems with the accounting method, the
manipulation has not gotten to a point where it has impaired the distinction of value vs.
growth in the Fama-French 3 -Factor model. The replication of the original methodology
resulted in either higher or statistically similar explanatory results each time compared to
a diversified portfolio.
Brick-and-mortar retail is a mature industry that has seen large share repurchases.
Retail stocks account for about half of the 23 negative shareholder equity firms in the
S&P 500. This industry becomes a sample of convenience for examining the philosophy
behind accounting for share repurchases. Of course, the artificially small accounting
capital (book value) relative to market-based capital (stock price) will continue to be a
problem.
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H2: Stock Option Evidence
Due to data limitations, this study only uses stock options for its equity-based
compensation hypothesis. However, over time, stock options have become less relevant.
Sammer (2014) explained stock options as a form of performance-based compensation
have declined in popularity over time, overtaken by whole share forms like restricted
stock and performance-based stock. Bonaimé, Kahle, Moore, and Nemani (2020) handcollected data to show the drop in stock options and rise in whole-share compensation
units, as shown in Figure 1. As the logic applied to stock options (share repurchases are
used as a tool to offset compensation-based issuance) extends to whole-share costs, these
should have been incorporated into the analysis in the ideal case. Based on the impact of
the number of shares awarded, this study likely under-counted the impact of pre-paid
stock compensation expense by more than half. Consequently, significant limitations
were placed upon the information, to be gained by the value of the adjustment.
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Figure 1: Stock-based compensation grants collected by Bonaime, Kahle, Moore,
and Nemani (2020, p. 40)
"Annual average restricted stock and option grants, scaled by the number of
shares outstanding, from 1994 to 2012 for our sample of 1,000 firms (Bonamie et al.,
2020, p.40)."

Differentiated results of this adjustment were almost non-existent. Young
technology companies tend to be the most generous with stock-based compensation, but
due to their insatiable need for cash to fuel growth, they are also the least likely to
repurchase shares. More mature companies use share repurchases to fund stock options
and restricted stock grants. However, the difference, likely more than cut in half, was not
so significant as to easily force a low book-to-market ratio stock to become a high bookto-market stock. Consequently, while H2 was not supported, the question lingers,
nevertheless. Accounting for the repurchase of shares and the issuance of those shares for
compensation continues to be disconnected.
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H3: Internally Generated Goodwill
Return on equity is designed to help measure a company's capital allocation
decisions. However, excessive share repurchases and the disconnect between historical
value-based and market-value-based assessments have allowed companies to register a
"return of capital" of capital it never recorded. Recording the repurchase of shares as a
return of capital at market value lowers the book value of the remaining shares and
distorts capital allocation assessment. As a result, users of financial data often turn to
"invested capital" or "tangible invested capital" to assess a company's use of resources.
Nevertheless, if a company uses the same cash to buy the shares of a separate legal entity,
it gets to recognize the difference between the book value and the market value of the
assets acquired as goodwill. The internally generated goodwill hypothesis attempts to
level these two similar transactions and leaves a permanent record (rather than one
hidden through the selective retirement of shares) for users of the financial statements to
assess management's capital allocation decisions.
While the internally generated goodwill was not a universal improvement over the
traditional Fama-French model, this treatment showed a stronger (i.e., less than 0.001)
difference in ∆R2 in portfolios with a low market-to-book ratio. This is evidence that
some value stocks are tainting the growth stock portfolios. One commonly accepted
definition of "growth stocks" is firms whose growth opportunities outweigh their ability
to generate funding internally. In other words, growth stocks are a consumer of capital,
not a generator of it. Companies labeled traditionally as growth stocks tend to be in
markets like technology, financial services, and business services where the physical
asset bases shown on the balance sheet (and reflected in book value) are much smaller
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than the company's market value. This would suggest these types of companies would
likely show a significant change in their book values if internally generated goodwill is
capitalized. However, since the mechanism employed in this study is share repurchases,
and growth companies have greater demands on their capital than the repurchasing of
shares, most will remain low book-to-market companies. The slight improvement in the
explanatory power of the adjusted Fama French model for growth portfolios suggests that
some value companies may have been masquerading as growth before the adjustment.
The internally generated goodwill adjustment had a higher R 2 from 2014-2019 for 19 of
the 30 industries versus the original Fama-French treatment. However, its improvement
was typically slight. The most significant improvements can be seen in the Business
Equipment and Services industries – both of which house technology-based growth
stocks.
Interestingly, this adjustment performs significantly worse in the same fields
where the Cash Value of Repurchased Shares works much better (and vice versa).
Returning to the example of the Business Equipment and Services industries, while the
internally generated goodwill treatment results in the highest R 2 for the 2014-2019
period, the cash value of repurchased shares drops significantly. Moreover, it is not
statistically significant in the Business Equipment field and only significant in the
Services industry for p<.05. This suggests that it is the capture of goodwill and not the
full dollar value of money spent that is lending strength to the explanatory power of the
model. On the flip side, the Health industry is better explained by the cash-value of
acquisitions than the internally generated goodwill treatment, with a 76.2% R 2 for the
cash value and a 69.1% R2 for the goodwill treatment. This is solid evidence that the
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market is more nuanced in its beliefs than a single accounting treatment for share
repurchases would suggest. In other words, the market does not necessarily treat
repurchased shares as a permanent return of capital.
H4: Cash Acquisition Asset
GAAP treatment of repurchased shares was debated well into the 1970s. The
current return of capital method treatment of share repurchases was rapidly adopted when
the IRS proposed taxing companies on gains from buying back and subsequently reissuing their own stock. By treating it as a return of capital, and its subsequent re-issue as
a new capital raise, no taxes were incurred (Horwitz & Young, 1975). The current
method completely ignores future use. However, treasury shares are routinely re-issued
for compensation and acquisition. Jenkins & Ovtchinnikov (2010) found that when a
company used treasury stock to make an acquisition, the market reaction was similar to
cash-based rather than newly issued share-based acquisitions. An argument can be made
that, although fungible, the market perceived the treasury stock as worth more than the
newly issue stock because a concreate financial transaction occurred to value the treasury
stock, and management may have shown greater capital allocation discipline in line with
Jensen's agency theorem (1986).
Results from this hypothesis were significantly worse overall. The market, for the
most part, does not treat share repurchases as assets. However, there was one major
exception. The “Health” industry had a significantly higher R 2 than any other treatment
from 2014-2019. This period in the Health industry was characterized by significant
acquisitions coupled with relatively low repurchase activity (when compared to other
sectors). Consequently, this result suggests that investors are willing to treat repurchased
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shares as a temporary holding to be used later for acquisitions. A quick study of the
health sector members of the S&P 500 showed that weighted average share counts
increased in 46% of companies in the sector during the five years studied due to
acquisition (Bloomberg, 2021b).
H5: Put Option Hypothesis
With so many options available for the use of treasury shares, the recording of a
put-option value as an asset would appear to be the logical compromise to all the
aforementioned treatments of repurchased shares. It does not require any single use;
retired shares would reduce the put option value; and it would be the closest estimate of
the economic cost of repurchasing shares with the power to either benefit or punish
managers for poor market timing. However, this hypothesis never improved explanatory
value over the original Fama French model. Most of the time, the adjustment did not
make a significant difference in the book value of companies. It may be because the
adjustment is not big enough. To wit, approximately 20 companies represented more than
half of the repurchased shares in 2018 and 2019 (S&P, 2020), suggesting any changes
would have only affected relatively few observations. Additionally, this required the use
of the "treasury stock" rather than "retirement" method of accounting – further reducing
its impact. In the end, the adjustments were just too small to make a difference. While
this alternative treatment of repurchased shares has the benefit of being able to be
consistently applied and does not require an auditor to presume what a company would
do with the shares, no evidence was found to support it.
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Study Limitations
There are several potential limitations to this study. First, this study employed the
Fama-French 3-Factor model to explain stock market returns. While this is a well-known
and accepted method, the required division at the 30% and 70% breakpoints of the HML
factor may not have been sensitive enough to detect the methodologies' differences. Like
a residual income-based model, other models, where book value is a more sensitive input,
may show different results.
Additionally, this study relied on CUSIP matching rather than CCM matching to
create the Fama French factors. This reduced the "n" by a statistically significant amount.
Using a more precise matching method may result in different results.
For the second hypothesis, this dissertation could only obtain information about
stock options rather than all stock-based compensation. This likely reduced the impact of
the adjustment by more than half its actual implication. Additionally, due to disclosure,
stock options could not match with their repurchased shares each year they were issued
but instead were clumped together at year-end pricing.
To optimally identify internally generated goodwill and the cash acquisition asset,
the repurchased shares' timing would need to be more precise than this dissertation was
able to do. While quarterly data of the amount and price paid for repurchased shares are
available in 10-Ks and 10-Qs, this data was not available in CompStat. Consequently, this
dissertation had to use a proxy of the average share price during the year and re-price the
entire amount of treasury shares or eight years of net retired shares each year. In contrast,
a multi-year approach would have reflected the projected treatment more accurately.
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Future Studies
Given the continued high explanatory ability of the unaltered Fama-French 3-Factor
Model, we conclude that share repurchases have not yet impaired its ability to explain
variabilities in returns. However, there is evidence that the model is missing some
potential explanatory power. While the differences are usually relatively small over the
entire sample set (1994-2019), the original Fama-French model had the highest
explanatory power in 9 of the 30 industries, but that has dropped to 3 of 30 in the most
recent five year period. It is possible that this study is too early in the cycle to see the
ultimate deterioration of the Fama-French 3-Factor Model's explanatory power.
One interesting implication that warrants future study is the SMB factor's
improvement under several of the hypothesized treatments. This study often noted that
total R2 remained steady or declined, but R2 for a two-factor model of just market beta
and the SMB factor improved. This phenomenon may result from fewer "big" companies
being excluded from the same set because of negative book value. A study separating the
creation of the SMB and HML factors should be considered.
Additionally, there may be alternative methods that are not subject to the account
vagaries of share repurchases to isolate the growth vs. value stock returns that HML is
supposed to proxy. Potential substitutions could be a Market Value to Enterprise Value
approach or a free cash flow-based approach to identify nets users or generators of
capital.
The use of share repurchases has escalated far beyond the level when most of the
research surrounding the signaling effects and market timing of the purchases was
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conducted. Has management behavior and market reaction changed as share repurchases
become ever more extensive?
Finally, based on logic, recognizing a put-option value of repurchased shares would
seem to be the most robust economic cost argument. This author could not find any
evidence of this model in academic or practitioner literature and should be studied.
Conclusion
Like many things, the answer to the fundamental question, “how does the market
think about share repurchases?” is “it depends.” The market seems to recognize multiple
reasons to repurchase and re-issue shares. It is more nuanced in its thinking than a blunt
object like the Fama-French 3-Factor Model can tease out. However, the possible
recognition of internally generated goodwill and the cash-like asset treatment of treasury
shares may result in higher explanatory power as more and more companies leverage
their balance sheets to new heights.
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